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CRIMINAL LAW
MASS INCARCERATION PARADIGM SHIFT?:
CONVERGENCE IN AN AGE OF
DIVERGENCE
MUGAMBI JOUET*
The peculiar harshness of modern American justice has led to a
vigorous scholarly debate about the roots of mass incarceration and its
divergence from humanitarian sentencing norms prevalent in other Western
democracies. Even though the United States reached virtually world-record
imprisonment levels between 1983 and 2010, the Supreme Court never found
a prison term to be “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth
Amendment. By countenancing extreme punishments with no equivalent
elsewhere in the West, such as life sentences for petty recidivists, the Justices’
reasoning came to exemplify the exceptional nature of American justice.
Many scholars concluded that punitiveness had become its defining norm.
Yet a quiet revolution in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, a wave of
reforms, and other social developments suggest that American penal
philosophy may be inching toward norms—dignity, proportionality,
legitimacy, and rehabilitation—that have checked draconian prison terms in
Europe, Canada, and beyond. In 2010, the Supreme Court began limiting
the scope of life imprisonment without parole for juveniles in a series of
landmark Eighth Amendment cases. Partly drawing upon the principles in
these decisions, twenty-two states have abolished life without parole
categorically for juveniles, providing them more protections than under the
Eighth Amendment. The narrow focus on the differences between juveniles
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and adults in the aftermath of these reforms obscured American law’s
increasing recognition of humanitarian norms that are hardly agedependent—and strikingly similar to those in other Western democracies.
Historiography sheds light on why the academy has largely overlooked this
relative paradigm shift. As America faced mass incarceration of an
extraordinary magnitude, research in recent decades has focused on
divergence, not convergence.
This Article advances a comparative theory of punishment to analyze
these developments. In the United States and throughout the West,
approaches toward punishment are impermanent social constructs, as they
historically tend to fluctuate between punitive and humanitarian concerns.
Such paradigm shifts can lead to periods of international divergence or
convergence in penal philosophy. Notwithstanding the ebb and flow of penal
attitudes, certain long-term trends have emerged in Western societies. They
encompass a narrowing scope of offenders eligible for the harshest
sentences, a reduction in the application of these sentences, and intensifying
social divides about their morality. Restrictions on lifelong imprisonment
for juveniles and growing social polarization over mass incarceration in the
United States may reflect this movement. However, American justice
appears particularly susceptible to unpredictable swings and backlashes.
While this state of impermanence suggests that the reform movement might
reverse itself, it also demonstrates that American justice may keep
converging toward humanitarian sentencing norms, which were influential
in the United States before the mass incarceration era.
Two patterns regarding the broader evolution of criminal punishment
ultimately stand out: cyclicality and steadiness of direction. The patterns
evoke a seismograph that regularly swings up or down despite moving
steadily in a given direction. American justice may cyclically oscillate
between repressive or humanitarian aspirations, and simultaneously
converge with other Western democracies in gradually limiting or abolishing
the harshest punishments over the long term.
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INTRODUCTION
Mass incarceration has been such an enduring and extraordinary
phenomenon that it has profoundly shaped the notion that justice in the
United States is inherently harsher than in Europe, where more humane
conceptions of punishment are influential. Because prison population
explosion emerged approximately four decades ago,1 many jurists have
known no other penal system in America. The Supreme Court’s reasoning
only reinforced this image. As America faced imprisonment levels on a scale
virtually unprecedented in global history,2 the Court recurrently concluded
that the Eighth Amendment’s bar on “cruel and unusual punishments”
effectively does not cover draconian prison terms.3 These circumstances
came to obscure how conceptions of justice in America have historically been
impermanent, ebbing and flowing between repressive and humanitarian
approaches.
Despite the extensive scholarly focus on America’s divergence from
Europe in the mass incarceration era,4 a remarkable measure of convergence
1

See generally Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 939
(2016) (discussing the gradual surge of the U.S. incarceration rate from the 1970s to the
2000s).
2
See generally CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY, US RATES OF INCARCERATION: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE, NAT’L COUNCIL CRIME & DELINQ. 3 (2006).
3
See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 83 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of fiftyyear-to-life sentence for petty recidivist); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003)
(plurality opinion) (upholding constitutionality of twenty-five-year-to-life sentence for petty
recidivist); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (plurality opinion) (upholding
constitutionality of life imprisonment without parole for first-time felon convicted of
possessing a large quantity of cocaine). Prior to Harmelin, the last Supreme Court decision to
hold a prison sentence unconstitutional was Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983), which
found life without parole “cruel and unusual punishment” for a petty offender who had issued
a no account check for $100.
4
Scholars have advanced diverse theories about the causes of mass incarceration and the
United States’ divergence from norms that have tempered punitiveness in Europe, Canada,
and other democratic societies. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (describing mass incarceration
as primarily the product of institutional racism); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL:
CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2002) [hereinafter “THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL”] (arguing that various social factors shaped harsher attitudes toward crime and
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has received scant attention. American penal philosophy may be inching
toward penal norms that have checked ruthless prison terms in modern
Europe: dignity, proportionality, legitimacy, and rehabilitation. As the
Supreme Court recognized these norms in landmark decisions limiting
juveniles’ eligibility for life without parole—Graham v. Florida,5 Miller v.
Alabama,6 and Montgomery v. Louisiana7—the evolution of juvenile justice
overshadowed how these are non-age-dependent sentencing principles that
could also protect adult prisoners. The way that American jurists
increasingly think of juveniles’ rights resembles the way that European
jurists tend to think of the rights of both juveniles and adults. Yet, prior to
Graham, dissenting Justices had already advanced these principles in
contributed to mass incarceration); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS:
PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF THE NATURAL ORDER (2011) (analyzing the interrelated
evolution of capitalism and penal systems since the nineteenth century); MUGAMBI JOUET,
EXCEPTIONAL AMERICA: WHAT DIVIDES AMERICANS FROM THE WORLD AND FROM EACH
OTHER 195 (2017) (arguing that mass incarceration is the product of a “poisonous cocktail
blending multiple peculiar ingredients,” including atypical institutions, a shift in judicial
philosophy, limited socioeconomic solidarity, racial discrimination, religious traditionalism,
populism, anti-intellectualism, sensationalized media coverage of crime, a subculture of
violence, a narrow conception of human dignity, and skepticism of international human rights
standards); JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (providing data suggesting that prosecutors were
particularly instrumental in driving mass incarceration because of their increased tendency to
file felony charges); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007)
(analyzing how changing conceptions of American government in the post-New Deal era
contributed to mass incarceration); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) (identifying a broad range of institutional, legal, and social factors
behind mass incarceration); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND
THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003) (describing how the historical
trend in the United States has been to normalize the harsh treatment of low-status persons,
unlike in continental Europe); Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the
Lens of Mass Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 385 (2018) (analyzing the influential role of
legislators, among other social actors, in driving mass incarceration by passing harsh
sentencing laws); Kleinfeld, supra note 1, at 939 (exploring the “great divergence” between
America and Europe regarding criminal punishment).
5
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (barring life imprisonment without parole for
juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses). Graham partly stems from the Court’s abolition
of the juvenile death penalty. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572–73 (2005) (reasoning
that “[t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well
understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient
culpability”).
6
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding that life in prison without parole
cannot be a mandatory punishment for juveniles convicted of homicide).
7
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (holding that Miller established a
substantive constitutional rule that should apply retroactively to teenagers mandatorily
sentenced to life without parole).
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controversial 5-4 decisions affirming life sentences inflicted on nonviolent
adult offenders.8 A difference of one vote would therefore have led to earlier
convergence,9 further calling into question essentialism about the inherent
harshness of American justice. Strikingly, in the Graham line of decisions,
the Court adopted multiple sentencing principles that it once rejected and that
are the norm in Europe.10
This Eighth Amendment paradigm shift may be a microcosm of broader
developments in American penal philosophy. After decades of relative
indifference, mass incarceration has become the object of greater public
concern, thereby leading to diverse state and federal reforms benefiting both
juveniles and adults.11 While scholars have downplayed the Supreme Court’s
role in penal reform by emphasizing that criminal justice is primarily run at
the state and local levels, they have neglected how a symbiotic relationship
can exist between its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment and state
reform movements.12 Tellingly, state reformers nationwide invoked the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery as a
justification to make their juvenile justice systems less punitive.13 As of
October 2019, twenty-two states had abolished life without parole
categorically for juveniles—providing them more protections than what the
Eighth Amendment requires—a four-fold increase in the number of
abolitionist states since 2012.14
8

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 77 (Souter, J., dissenting); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 35 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263, 285 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 381 (1982)
(per curiam) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9
See id.
10
See infra Section II.
11
See infra Section III.
12
See infra note 404 and accompanying text.
13
See generally CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS: THE
FIVE-YEAR GROUNDSWELL OF STATE BANS ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILDREN (2016)
[hereinafter “CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS”]; see also
infra Section III.
14
CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, States that Ban Life without Parole
for Children, https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.org/media-resources/states-that-ban-life/
[https://perma.cc/3ZFN-M3UG] (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) [hereinafter “CAMPAIGN FOR THE
FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, States that Ban Life without Parole for Children”]; see also State
v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 346 (Wash. 2018) (abolishing life without parole for juveniles under
the Washington Constitution); State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016) (abolishing
life without parole for juveniles under the Iowa Constitution); CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR
SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS, supra note 13 (describing nationwide reform
movement to abolish life imprisonment without parole for juveniles). The shift has not been
uniform, as various jurisdictions balked at the notion of treating juveniles less punitively.
Illustratively, “[t]o the dismay of many penal reformers and juvenile advocates, the state of
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Overlooking the broader view of the Graham, Miller, and Montgomery
trilogy, jurists have largely reduced these cases to a narrow “juveniles are
different” doctrine. Focusing on neurological and social science that the
Justices cited to support their conclusion regarding the diminished culpability
of immature teenagers,15 experts have mainly identified the Graham line of
cases as stepping stones toward expanding the rights of juveniles, not
adults.16
This Article examines a hypothesis with wider implications: whether
American penal philosophy is inching toward norms that protect all people
from draconian prison terms in contemporary Western democracies. Under
this hypothesis, approaches toward punishment are impermanent social
constructs, as they tend to cyclically fluctuate between repressive and
humanitarian concerns. Such paradigm shifts can lead to periods of
international divergence or convergence in penal philosophy. After a lengthy
period of divergence, American justice may thus be drawing closer to norms
that have tempered punitiveness in Europe. While the emergence of the
Pennsylvania reacted to the Miller decision by hastily enacting [harsh] legislation.” Marie
Gottschalk, Sentenced to Life: Penal Reform and the Most Severe Sanctions, 9 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 353, 359 (2013). Pennsylvania thus replaced mandatory life without parole for
juveniles with a dismal choice: life without parole (again) or 25 to 35 years in prison prior to
eligibility for parole. Id.
15
See generally Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court
Decisions About Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 513,
515–16 (2013) (“Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court Decisions”).
16
See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS, supra
note 13, at 4 (discussing the “growing momentum across state legislatures to reform criminal
sentencing laws to prohibit children from being sentenced to life without parole”); Beth
Caldwell, Banished for Life: Deportation of Juvenile Offenders as Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2261 (2013) (suggesting that immigration authorities apply
Graham and Miller’s reasoning to juvenile deportation proceedings); Barry C. Feld, A Slower
Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without
Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 9, 64–65 (2008) (arguing that Roper’s
reasoning be extended to juvenile life imprisonment cases); Sarah French Russell, Review for
Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J.
373 (2014) (arguing that Graham and Miller should lead to reforms in juvenile parole
procedures); Robin Walker Sterling, Juvenile-Sex-Offender Registration: An Impermissible
Life Sentence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 295 (2015) (proposing reforms to teenage sex offender
registration based on Graham and Miller). By contrast, few scholars have especially focused
on extending Graham and its progeny to the rights of adult prisoners. See, e.g., Jonathan
Simon, Dignity and Risk: The Long Road from Graham v. Florida to Abolition of Life without
Parole, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 282 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012);
William W. Berry III, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than Death, 71 OHIO ST. L.J.
1109, 1113 (2010) (arguing that Graham should lead to heightened constitutional review of
all life without parole sentences); Michael M. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham
and Miller to Adults, 78 MO. L. REV. 1087 (2013) (discussing prospects for broadening the
Court’s juvenile jurisprudence to adults).
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Graham, Miller, and Montgomery jurisprudence provides a lay of the land—
an ecology of sentencing in modern America—the Article is not about
doctrine but about a broader phenomenon in the evolution of penal
philosophy. These cases illustrate the phenomenon, yet the Article’s final
section provides other examples, such as the evolution of the death penalty
in America and the rest of the Western world.17
Moreover, alongside these cycles of divergence and convergence,
another pattern may be at play: a long-term trend toward limiting or
abolishing the harshest criminal punishments in the West. Scholars have
often described the United States as an exception to this trend, and justifiably
so given the harshness of its penal system.18 Nevertheless, Supreme Court
decisions and state reforms restricting the scope of life without parole, the
polarization of American society over mass incarceration, the decline of the
death penalty, and other social developments may reflect the long-term
evolution of punishment in Western democracies. From this angle, America
may be a laggard rather than the permanent exception in circumscribing the
harshest punishments.19 Even though the relative steadiness of this long-term
abolitionist trend may appear incompatible with the unsteadiness of cyclical
attitudes toward punishment, we will see that this is not necessarily the case
after widening the historical lens.20
The Article therefore identifies two simultaneous historical patterns—
cyclicality and steadiness of direction—influencing criminal punishments in
Western societies. It is not a historicist account affirming that the evolution
of punishment follows rigid historical laws.21 These patterns are amenable
to change or reversal, as history does not inherently flow in a particular
direction. Still, examining such patterns can help understand a given
historical period. The magnitude of mass incarceration in the United States
has at times eclipsed these historical undercurrents and fostered essentialism
about the ruthlessness of American justice. While scholars have advanced
insightful theories regarding the emergence of mass incarceration,22 an
17

See infra Section III.
See generally supra note 4.
19
See generally David Garland, Capital Punishment and American Culture, 7
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 347, 355 (2005).
20
See infra Section III.
21
“Historicism” has multiple definitions, which can range from historical analysis in
general to distinct philosophical understandings. See Dwight E. Lee & Robert N. Beck, The
Meaning of Historicism, 59 AM. HIST. REV. 568, 577 (1954). In this Article, the term refers to
the notion that a set of “laws” steers the history of humankind, such as the claim that societies
inherently evolve toward progress. See also KARL R. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM
3, 5, 41, 81 (2d ed. 1976) (calling into question the existence of historical laws).
22
See supra note 4.
18
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intricate phenomenon defying a single explanation,23 the patterns that this
Article describes are another piece of the puzzle.
Avoiding a simple dichotomy between America and Europe, this Article
also considers the rest of the Western world: Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand.24 Humanitarian sentencing norms appear to have gone the farthest
in Europe, although they are influential in Canada and play a non-negligible
role in Australia and New Zealand.25 These circumstances suggest that
humanitarian sentencing norms are not fundamentally “European” and are
evolving in diverse Western societies. These developments are relevant to
Émile Durkheim’s sociological theory regarding the gradual expansion of
prisoners’ rights in liberal democracies.26 We will accordingly examine the
implications of Durkheim’s century-old theory, particularly because it
addressed the norm of “dignity,”27 which has gained traction in the United
States and other modern Western democracies.28
Research on international convergence has primarily focused on a
different matter: the U.S. Supreme Court’s contentious citation of global
standards as persuasive authority in several Eighth Amendment cases.29
Carol Steiker has observed how academics have offered a “wide range of explanatory
accounts . . . about the divergence of the United States in criminal and capital justice policies.”
Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and Contingency, 125 HARV. L. REV. 760, 764 (2012)
(book review). The intriguing validity of disparate theories evokes “the parable of the blind
men describing an elephant based on their examination of a single part (the trunk, the ear, the
tail, and so forth),” as scholars may identify “a different creature depending on the nature of
the chosen focal point.” Id.
24
Legal scholars, sociologists, and political scientists typically favor comparing the
United States to other Western nations sharing democratic political systems, industrialized
economies, and relatively similar cultural roots. On the comparison of the United States to
other Western nations, see generally JOUET, supra note 4; JOHN W. KINGDON, AMERICA THE
UNUSUAL (1999); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED
SWORD (1997). Russia and certain Russian-leaning former Soviet bloc countries like Belarus
are not normally considered Western nations. JOUET, supra note 4, at 6.
25
See infra Section II.
26
Émile Durkheim, Deux lois de l’évolution pénale, 4 ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE 65 (1900).
27
Id. at 88–90.
28
See infra Section II.A.
29
Martha Minow has shed light on this controversy. “In recent years, I have watched the
swirling debate over whether the United States courts should consult international or
comparative law,” she writes, explaining that it is a puzzling debate since “no one disagrees
that United States judges have long consulted and referred to [such] materials.” Martha
Minow, The Controversial Status of International and Comparative Law in the United States,
52 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1, 1–2 (2010), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/10511098 [https
://perma.cc/92UK-5W2H]; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why and How to Study
“Transnational” Law, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 97, 129 n.47 (2011) (“In recent years, there has
been extensive debate about what role the use and interpretation of ‘foreign’ or international
law should have in American constitutional jurisprudence.”); e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
23
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Scholarship has mostly ignored the dimensions of convergence I identify in
this Article, including a revealing citation across the Atlantic. The European
Court of Human Rights pointed to the Supreme Court’s Graham opinion for
support when abolishing life sentences with no possibility of release for
European prisoners.30 This is partly because Graham and its progeny
recognized core principles resembling those in European penal philosophy:
i) punishments must not violate human dignity; ii) punishments must be
proportional to culpability; iii) punishments must serve a legitimate penal
purpose; and iv) punishments should generally provide hope for
rehabilitation and release.
First, this Article describes how justice in America and other Western
democracies diverged tremendously for decades, which underscores the
significance of subsequent developments. The Eighth Amendment’s
interpretation is a microcosm of this historical period. Between 1983 and
2010, the Supreme Court never found a prison sentence “cruel and unusual
punishment.”31 As America faced mass incarceration on virtually worldrecord levels, a slim majority of Justices concluded that even inflicting life
sentences on petty recidivists, such as shoplifters, was not “cruel and
unusual.”32
Second, I suggest that American penal philosophy may be converging
toward humanitarian norms—dignity, proportionality, legitimacy, and
rehabilitation—that are prevalent in European nations, Canada, and various
other liberal democracies. Beginning in 2010, the Justices applied these
principles in juvenile life without parole cases, but I present the hypothesis

48, 81 (2010) (underlining that “the United States is the only Nation that imposes life without
parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders,” which the unratified Convention on the
Rights of the Child forbids); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (finding that “the
United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the
juvenile death penalty,” which would violate the Convention on the Rights of the Child);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (noting that “within the world community,
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is
overwhelmingly disapproved”).
30
Case of Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom, 66069/09, 130/10, and 3896/10, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2013) [hereinafter “Vinter”], ¶ 73 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 48). Graham was
among the diverse sources that the European Judges cited in their vast survey of international
and foreign law barring life sentences. See id. ¶¶ 59–75.
31
Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G. REP. 49, 49 (2010) (“Before
Graham it had been almost three decades since the Court had found a noncapital sentence
unconstitutional . . . .”); Eva Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of
Humane Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 148 (2007)
(noting that since Solem, a 1983 decision, the Justices “never reversed a non-death sentence
on the ground that it was too severe for the crime of conviction”).
32
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 63 (2003).
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that these principles are not fundamentally age-dependent, which is why
European courts notably tend to apply them to all prisoners. For instance, a
person cannot forfeit her dignity by entering adulthood, as dignity is a
principle rooted in the intrinsic worth of a human being. Historiography, the
history of historical studies, helps explain why these signs of convergence
have received limited attention. Given the extraordinary harshness of
American justice in the age of mass incarceration, scholarship in recent
decades has primarily focused on analyzing its divergence from European
penal philosophy.33
Third, I present a comparative theory on the historical evolution of
American justice to shed light on these developments. Approaches toward
punishment are impermanent social constructs that ebb and flow between
repressive and rehabilitative aspirations. Such cycles are not unique to the
United States, as they exist throughout the West, from Europe to Canada to
Australia to New Zealand. Depending on the period, the sociopolitical
climate may lead penal attitudes in diverse Western nations to move in
similar or opposite directions. These circumstances are among the reasons
why the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as state courts and legislatures, may be
converging toward humanitarian sentencing norms prevalent in other
Western democracies following decades of divergence. Yet the modern
American penal system appears particularly susceptible to swings and
backlashes. Although this state of impermanence suggests that the quiet
revolution in American penal philosophy might be stopped in its tracks or
potentially rolled back, it confirms that penal norms in America are not
locked in stone and could continue converging with Europe, Canada, and
beyond. Indeed, beside the cyclicality of penal attitudes, certain long-term
trends stand out in Western societies, including narrowed eligibility for the
harshest punishments, reduced frequency of these punishments, and
intensifying social divides about their acceptability, which may eventually
lead to their abolition.34
While mass incarceration is a multifaceted problem that cannot be
resolved by a silver bullet,35 this Article ultimately suggests that an Eighth
Amendment paradigm shift could be a step toward reducing America’s
immense prison population. Experts generally agree that the reform
proposals that have received the most public attention and support, such as
decriminalizing marijuana and ending the “War on Drugs,” cannot
33

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See Garland, supra note 19, at 355.
35
Scholars have identified a host of factors shaping mass incarceration, thereby
suggesting the need to envision reform from multiple angles. See generally supra notes 4, 23
and accompanying text.
34
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unilaterally end mass incarceration.36 By the same token, the Supreme Court
or other federal authorities cannot singlehandedly tackle mass incarceration,
as criminal justice in America is mainly controlled by state and local
governments. We will nonetheless see that a symbiotic relationship can exist
between the Court’s decisions and reforms by state actors. Yet Justices may
prove more receptive to some claims than others. For example, addressing
institutional racism may be indispensable to lasting criminal justice reform,
but the Supreme Court has presently closed the door to such systemic
constitutional challenges.37
By contrast, the Eighth Amendment’s
reinvigoration could restrict sentences that disproportionately harm racial
and ethnic minorities, as well as socioeconomically disadvantaged whites.
The reasoning of Graham, Miller, and Montgomery may thus provide
guidance to ensure that all persons receive humane sentences. Although U.S.
juvenile justice remains very harsh by international standards, it is the sphere
of American justice where the principles of dignity, proportionality,
legitimacy, and rehabilitation have gained the most traction, partly due to the
Supreme Court’s impetus. From juvenile justice, these principles may
contribute to a broader paradigm shift in the penal system.
I. DIVERGENCE: AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND MASS
INCARCERATION
Without taking measure of how American law embraced extraordinary
punitiveness for decades, one cannot fully grasp the changing penal
landscape following Supreme Court decisions and state reforms gradually
restricting the scope of life without parole since 2010.38 Accordingly, this
36

See generally James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the
New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 24–25 (2012) (emphasizing that mass incarceration is
not “exclusively (or overwhelmingly) a result of the War on Drugs,” as “drug offenders
constitute only a quarter of our nation’s prisoners, while violent offenders make up a much
larger share: one-half”); see also U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2015 14
(2016) (indicating that 52.9% of state prisoners were convicted for violent crimes).
37
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320 (1987) (holding that statistical evidence of
institutional racism in capital sentencing is irrelevant, as defendants must prove specific intent
of discrimination in their individual case—a nearly unattainable standard of proof without
examining systemic patterns). Many scholars have analyzed how McCleskey and other
decisions have precluded successful constitutional challenges to institutional racism in the
penal system. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Race and Proportionality Since McCleskey v.
Kemp (1987): Different Actors with Mixed Strategies of Denial and Avoidance, 39 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143, 143 (2007); John J. Donohue, Empirical Analysis and the Fate of
Capital Punishment, 11 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 84, 85, 94, 105 (2016); Ian F.
Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1835, 1841–42 (2000).
38
See infra Sections II and III.
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section will present evidence suggesting that American justice profoundly
diverges from humanitarian norms prevalent in other Western democracies,
before considering evidence that American justice may be converging toward
these norms in the next section.
At the outset, it may reasonably appear as if Americans approach
criminal punishment from a radically different angle than Europeans, if not
the rest of the international community. The United States has the highest
incarceration rate worldwide.39 It is home to 5% of the world’s population
but a quarter of the world’s prisoners.40 Leaving aside Stalinist Russia, there
are few historical examples of mass incarceration on such a colossal scale.41
Mass incarceration is even more striking if one parses the “astronomical”
incarceration rate for African-Americans.42 The peculiar nature of mass
incarceration further comes to light when comparing the United States not
only to European countries, but also to the rest of the Western world: Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand.43 America’s incarceration rate is three to ten
times higher than those of other modern Western democracies.44 In the words
of David Garland, mass incarceration “is an unprecedented event in the
history of the U.S. and, more generally, in the history of liberal democracy.”45
My research has described how mass incarceration reflects “American
exceptionalism,” an idea often misunderstood or misrepresented as a faith in
American superiority.46 The primary definition of this storied concept has
historically been that America is an exception, objectively and descriptively,

39
WORLD PRISON BRIEF, PRISON POPULATION RATE, http://www.prisonstudies.org/
highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All [https://perma.cc
/L6AJ-NZ4S] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
40
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Fact Check: Does the United States Really Have 5 Percent of the
World’s Population and One Quarter of the World’s Prisoners?, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/04/30/does-the-united-statesreally-have-five-percent-of-worlds-population-and-one-quarter-of-the-worlds-prisoners/?utm
_term=.abd1b99e5138 [https://perma.cc/TB9X-D22P].
41
HARTNEY, supra note 2 (comparing the incarceration rate in modern America and the
Soviet Union in 1950). It is noteworthy that incarceration in Stalinist prisons was qualitatively
different since it encompassed the repression of alleged dissidents.
42
STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 47–48 (“If the general imprisonment rate is high, the rate of
black incarceration can fairly be called astronomical,” as in the year 2000 it “exceed[ed] by
one-fourth the imprisonment rate in the Soviet Union in 1950—near the end of Stalin’s reign,
the time when the population of the Soviet camps peaked”).
43
Regarding the definition of the Western world, see supra note 24.
44
See WORLD PRISON BRIEF, PRISON POPULATION RATE, supra note 39.
45
David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS
IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 1 (David Garland ed., 2001).
46
JOUET, supra note 4, at 21–26.
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especially compared to other Western democracies.47 Distinctive features of
American history, culture, law, politics, economic attitudes, religious beliefs,
and race relations have thus shaped peculiar ways of thinking about crime.
For instance, America has historically been the Western democracy with the
highest proportion of racial and ethnic minorities, which has fostered a
greater degree of institutional racism compared to European nations.48 Other
features of American exceptionalism, including the relative weight of
populism, anti-intellectual skepticism of expert knowledge, Christian
fundamentalism, and market fundamentalism have also been part of the
“poisonous cocktail” making modern American justice exceptionally harsh,
counter-productive, and inegalitarian.49
A defining feature of American exceptionalism and mass incarceration
long seemed to be the rejection of humanitarian sentencing principles that
have limited punitiveness in Europe: dignity, proportionality, legitimacy, and
rehabilitation.50 Marie Gottschalk illustratively described how “[o]ver the
past 40 years or so, retribution has become a central feature of U.S. penal
policy, supplanting rehabilitation and even public safety as the chief aim.”51
As Justice Antonin Scalia pointedly asserted during oral arguments in an
Eighth Amendment case, “modern penology has abandoned that
rehabilitation
thing,
and
they
no
longer
call
prisons
reformatories . . . [P]unishment is the criterion now. Deserved punishment
for crime.”52 Scalia went on to suggest that a punishment’s lack of
rehabilitative purpose was therefore “irrelevant.”53 Jonathan Simon has
equally observed how “[life without parole] defines the logic of
contemporary [American] penality . . . in its embrace of a totalizing promise
of prison incapacitation extended to the very limits of life, and unmediated
by any further consideration of the prisoner as a distinct human being.”54 By
contrast, the European Court of Human Rights has barred life without parole
as an inhumane punishment negating the value of prisoners’ lives, thereby

47
Id.; see also generally JACK P. GREENE, THE INTELLECTUAL CONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICA: EXCEPTIONALISM AND IDENTITY FROM 1942 TO 1800, 4–5 (1993); LIPSET, supra note
43, at 18; James W. Ceaser, The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism, 1 AM.
POL. THOUGHT 2 (2012).
48
JOUET, supra note 4, at 210–11.
49
Id. at 195.
50
See infra Section II.
51
Gottschalk, supra note 14, at 370.
52
Oral Argument at 18:49, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (No. 10-9646), https://
www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-9646 [https://perma.cc/F262-DMXR].
53
Id. at 19:07.
54
Simon, supra note 16, at 282.
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rejecting claims that this punishment is warranted by retribution or public
safety.55
An overview of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
from 1980 to 2010, the age of mass incarceration, would seem to confirm
that the humanitarian principles that have led other Western democracies to
significantly limit or fully forbid draconian prison sentences are incompatible
with the ethos of American justice. After all, even as the United States
practically reached world-record imprisonment levels, the Court repeatedly
held that extremely harsh prison terms do not violate the Eighth
Amendment’s bar on “cruel and unusual punishments.” This approach
mirrored wider social developments in how Americans thought about crime,
as Supreme Court decisions do not exist in a vacuum.
In Rummel v. Estelle, a 1980 decision, the Court reasoned that the Eighth
Amendment offers essentially no protection against prison terms lacking
proportionality to culpability.56 It thus affirmed the life sentence that a
defendant received under Texas’s “three strikes” statute for several minor
nonviolent offenses: fraudulently using a credit card to obtain $80 worth of
goods or services, passing a forged check for $28.36, and obtaining $120.75
by false pretenses.57 Over the dissenting opinion of four Justices, the
majority announced, “[O]ne could argue without fear of contradiction by any
decision of this Court that . . . the length of the sentence actually imposed
[for a felony] is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.”58 Put otherwise,
the Court notified state authorities that it would not preclude them from
imposing life sentences on any convicted felons.59 It added that Eighth
Amendment challenges should succeed only in “exceedingly rare”
situations.60
Two years later, Hutto v. Davis, a succinct per curiam decision, found
no constitutional violation with a Virginia prisoner’s forty-year sentence for
possession and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana.61 The Court
reiterated its “reluctan[ce] to review legislatively mandated terms of
imprisonment.”62 In a revealing twist of events, the Justices also
55

Vinter, ¶¶ 12, 21, 23, 46, 52, 119–22, 139.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 263 (1980).
57
Id. at 266.
58
Id. at 274.
59
The majority provided a minor caveat by stating in a footnote that “a proportionality
principle” might apply “if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life
imprisonment.” Id. at 274 n.11.
60
Id. at 272.
61
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370 (1982) (per curiam).
62
Id. at 374 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274).
56
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reprimanded both the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and a District Court
for their unwillingness to follow Rummel’s narrow interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment, as these lower courts had found the forty-year sentence
in Hutto unconstitutional notwithstanding Rummel.63 “[U]nless we wish
anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system,” the majority wrote, “a
precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no
matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.”64
Justice Lewis Powell grudgingly concurred with the Hutto majority,
feeling bound by Rummel despite his belief that the forty-year sentence was
“unjust and disproportionate to the offense” of possessing and distributing
marijuana “said to have a street value of about $200.”65 Three other Justices,
led by William Brennan, dissented in strong language denouncing the
majority’s decision to issue a per curiam opinion “[w]ith the benefit of
neither full briefing nor oral argument” in this important case.66 In their view,
the majority had moved toward “the complete abdication of our
responsibility to enforce the Eighth Amendment.”67
Around this period, state and local governments adopted increasingly
harsh sentencing laws and policies due to the rise of the “tough on crime”
movement.68 The Supreme Court’s decisions did not cause this social shift,
yet its majority’s reasoning tended to exemplify the evolution in American
penal attitudes. While rehabilitation was a core principle in American
sentencing in prior decades, it was largely discredited.69 Critics charged that
rehabilitation did not “work” and amounted to illegitimate, immoral
criminal-coddling.70 Once one assumes that most offenders are incorrigible
and nothing more than their worst acts, the next logical step is not difficult to
envision: “Lock them up and throw away the key.” From this angle, endless
prison terms cannot be “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment.
In 1983, however, the Court moved away from Rummel and Hutto’s
narrow conception of prisoners’ rights. The Court held in Solem v. Helm that
it was “cruel and unusual punishment” for South Dakota to inflict life without
63
Id. at 375; see also Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 449 (W.D. Va. 1977), aff’d
per curiam sub nom., Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981), rev’d sub nom., Hutto,
454 U.S. at 370.
64
Hutto, 454 U.S. at 375.
65
Id. (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
66
Id. at 381 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67
Id. at 383.
68
See supra note 4.
69
See generally GARLAND, supra note 4, at 20, 58, 62, 143; Michael Tonry, Can Twentyfirst Century Punishment Policies Be Justified in Principle?, in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST:
HAS IT A FUTURE? 3, 7–8 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011).
70
GARLAND, supra note 4, at 20, 58, 62, 143.
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parole on a petty recidivist who had issued a “no account” check for $100.71
The main reason for the Court’s change of direction appears to be the
evolving judicial philosophy of Justice Harry Blackmun.72 After being in the
majority in Rummel, Blackmun joined the four Justices who had dissented in
that precedent to form a new 5-4 majority in Solem.73 The Solem majority
notably reasoned that the Eighth Amendment encompasses a “general
principle of proportionality.”74 It identified three factors to determine
whether a prison sentence is disproportional: i) “the gravity of the offense
and harshness of the penalty”; ii) sentences imposed “in the same
jurisdiction”; and iii) sentences for “the same crime in other jurisdictions.”75
Nevertheless, Solem hardly seemed to spur a change in American penal
philosophy or undermine the “tough on crime” movement. The U.S.
incarceration rate nearly doubled in the next decade.76 The number of
successful Eighth Amendment challenges drawing upon Solem appears to
have been absolutely minimal.77 Conversely, dramatically less punitive penal
systems were becoming the norm elsewhere in the West.78 No other Western
democracy experienced mass incarceration.79 And even those possessing
their own versions of the “tough on crime” movement, from France to
Canada to New Zealand, had markedly more moderate penal systems than
71
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 277 (1983). The Supreme Court has historically found
Eighth Amendment violations in few other noncapital cases. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 98 (1976) (holding that deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs does
not comport with the Eighth Amendment); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958) (plurality
opinion) (holding that depriving a military deserter of his U.S. citizenship violated the Eighth
Amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (holding that sentencing a
defendant to hard labor for falsifying an official document violated the Eighth Amendment).
72
Justice Blackmun’s judicial philosophy particularly evolved on the death penalty during
his time on the Court. In his last year on the bench, he famously declared “I will no longer
tinker with the machinery of death.” Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
73
The four Rummel dissenters were Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis
Powell, and John Paul Stevens. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
74
Solem, 463 U.S. at 288.
75
Id. at 291–92.
76
The incarceration rate per 100,000 U.S. residents skyrocketed from 280 to 530 prisoners
between 1983 and 1993. U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, KEY STATISTIC: INCARCERATION
RATE (1980-2015), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=kfdetail&iid=493#Publications [https:
//perma.cc/A5Q3-AWMC] (last visited Oct. 2, 2017).
77
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1015 n.2 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (noting
that “the parties have cited only four cases decided in the [eight] years since Solem in which
sentences have been reversed on the basis of a proportionality analysis”).
78
See infra Section II.
79
See infra Section II.
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the United States.80 An uncanny taste for repression appeared to be a
dominant trait of American exceptionalism.81
In 1991, the Supreme Court revisited the application of the Eighth
Amendment to lengthy prison terms, but proved even less able to find
common ground. In Harmelin v. Michigan, a plurality decision, the Court
eviscerated the Solem standard and concluded that the Eighth Amendment’s
bar on “cruel and unusual punishments” does not require that a sentence be
“proportional” to the crime except in a capital case—a doctrine known as
“death is different.”82 The defendant in Harmelin had no prior felony
convictions.83 He received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
without parole after being convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine,84 a
substantial quantity sufficient to create between 32,500 and 65,000 doses.85
The mandatory life sentence precluded him from advancing any mitigating
evidence at sentencing. Justice Scalia wrote the principal opinion of the
plurality judgment declaring: “Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but
they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in
various forms throughout our Nation’s history.”86 In a separate section of his
opinion that was solely joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia argued that the Eighth Amendment was originally meant to “outlaw
particular modes of punishment,” such as torture, rather than
“disproportionate or excessive sentences.”87 Scalia asserted that “Solem was
simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality
guarantee.”88
Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and
David Souter, authored Harmelin’s controlling concurring opinion. Unlike
Scalia, Kennedy considered that the Eighth Amendment “encompasses a

80

See infra notes 216, 381–385 and accompanying text.
On the meaning of American exceptionalism, see supra notes 46–47, and
accompanying text.
82
See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995–96 (plurality opinion) (noting that solely death sentences
require individualized review under the Eighth Amendment given the “qualitative difference
between death and all other penalties”).
83
Id.
84
Id. at 961.
85
Id. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86
Id. at 995 (plurality opinion) (stating that “mandatory death sentences abounded in our
first Penal Code”).
87
Id. at 975–85 (emphasis in original).
88
Id. at 994–95.
81
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narrow proportionality principle.”89 Yet Kennedy found that this principle
was not violated by the first-time felon’s life sentence for drug possession.90
By contrast, the four dissenting Justices in Harmelin stood united in
concluding that the Eighth Amendment bars disproportional prison
sentences.91 Disputing the conclusions of Justice Scalia’s originalist analysis,
they advanced historical evidence that the original meaning of “cruel and
unusual punishments” either encompassed a review of disproportional prison
sentences or did not prohibit it.92 The dissenters further stressed that the
Eighth Amendment’s language is ambiguous93 and that the Court had
recognized that the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishments” depends on
the “‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.’”94 Drawing upon stare decisis, the four Justices concluded that the
plurality had failed to provide a reasonable basis to depart from the
proportionality standard established in Solem.95
The Harmelin plurality’s narrow conception of prisoners’ rights proved
controversial.96 Tellingly, the Michigan Supreme Court distanced itself from
it the following year.97 Even though the U.S. Supreme Court had found no
Eighth Amendment violation with the sentence that the Michigan defendant
had received in Harmelin, the Michigan Supreme Court emphasized that
Harmelin “is only persuasive authority for purposes of this Court’s
interpretation and application of the Michigan Constitution,” and that
“we may in some cases find more persuasive, and choose to rely upon, the
reasoning of the dissenting justices of [the United States Supreme Court].”98
The Michigan Supreme Court accordingly held that mandatory life without
parole was a disproportionately harsh punishment for cocaine possession

89

Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1009.
91
Justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens formally joined Justice Byron White’s
dissenting opinion. See id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice Thurgood Marshall filed a separate
dissent, stating, “I agree with Justice White’s dissenting opinion, except insofar as it asserts
that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not proscribe the
death penalty.” Id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall had formerly concluded that
the death penalty inherently violates the Eighth Amendment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009–12 (White, J., dissenting).
93
Id. at 1011.
94
Id. at 1015 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
95
Id. at 1021 (White, J., dissenting).
96
See generally Nilsen, supra note 31, at 113, 148, 169.
97
People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 875 (Mich. 1992); see also Nilsen, supra note 31,
at 165 n.262 (discussing Bullock and Michigan state reform efforts following Harmelin).
98
Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 870.
90
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under the Michigan Constitution.99 Harmelin may nonetheless be the most
significant precedent regarding the intersection of mass incarceration and
constitutional law. Despite being a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court and
lower courts proved highly deferential to its rationale that a prison sentence
need not be remotely proportional to culpability to pass muster under the
Eighth Amendment.100
Placed in a wider societal context, Harmelin epitomized the
contemporary American zeitgeist. By giving prisoners facing ruthless
sentences no constitutional recourse, Harmelin’s reasoning paralleled the
mercilessness characterizing American justice in this historical period.
Among other developments, “broken windows” policing advocated “zero
tolerance” against petty offenders,101 and legislative reforms provided for
lengthy mandatory stays in prison, if not permanent incapacitation,
regardless of mitigating circumstances.102
As mass incarceration reached historic levels, the Supreme Court heard
more challenges to extreme sentences. In 2003, in Ewing v. California,
another plurality found no constitutional violation by a sentence of twentyfive-years-to-life imposed on a man who had shoplifted golf clubs worth
approximately $1,200—his “third strike” under California law.103 The Ewing
plurality comprised of Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Rehnquist followed
Kennedy’s Harmelin concurrence by concluding that the Eighth Amendment
“forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the
crime.”104 The Ewing plurality additionally reasoned that three strikes laws
aim to punish, deter or incapacitate career criminals, thereby reflecting “a
rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference.”105 Justices Scalia and

Id. at 877. Moreover, “[i]n 1998, the Michigan legislature moved to an optional rather
than a mandatory life sentence and, in 2002, raised the triggering quantity from 650 to 1000
grams.” Elizabeth Napier Dewar, Comment, The Inadequacy of Fiscal Constraints as a
Substitute for Proportionality Review, 114 YALE L.J. 1177, 1180 n.18 (2005).
100
Barkow, supra note 31, at 49–50; Nilsen, supra note 31, at 113, 148, 169.
101
See generally LOÏC WACQUANT, PRISONS OF POVERTY 14–18 (2009).
102
See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND
DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 4–7, 17 (2001) (describing the
roots of the three strikes legislation that California adopted in 1994, which was a mandatory
version of preexisting laws on the incarceration of recidivists); Kate Stith & Steve Koh, The
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227–28, 231, 285–86 (1993) (explaining the emergence of
federal sentencing guidelines requiring harsh mandatory minimum stays in prison).
103
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (plurality opinion).
104
Id. at 23 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
105
Id. at 24–28, 30.
99
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Thomas concurred in the judgment but asserted that the Eighth Amendment
lacks any proportionality principle at all.106
In Lockyer v. Andrade, a habeas corpus case decided on the same day
as Ewing, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment likewise offered no
protection to Leandro Andrade, a petty, nonviolent recidivist who received a
fifty-year-to-life sentence under California’s three strikes statute after
shoplifting videotapes worth $153.107 Compared to Ewing, who had
previously been convicted of robbery at knifepoint,108 Andrade had a minor
criminal record consisting of convictions for theft, burglary, and marijuana
transportation.109 That did not change the equation. Writing for a 5-4
majority, Justice O’Connor reasoned that “[t]he gross disproportionality
principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary
case.”110 Andrade, then thirty-seven years old,111 was thus condemned to die
in prison for stealing videotapes. The dissenting Justices declared that “[i]f
Andrade’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate, the principle has no
meaning.”112
Leandro Andrade’s fate can also be understood in the context of the
American zeitgeist. By effectively negating the value of Andrade’s life, the
Supreme Court and California authorities seemed to adopt the ideology of
the so-called “victims’ rights” movement. The movement has commonly
reflected a “zero-sum” mindset perceiving any concern for prisoners’ rights,
well-being, or rehabilitation as being, anti-victim, unlike restorative justice
models.113 While the movement’s role in capital cases has received
significant attention,114 its logic extended to other areas of American
sentencing.115 Tending to victims or caring about the public meant that
106
Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment).
107
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 63 (2003).
108
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18–19.
109
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66–67.
110
Id. at 77.
111
Id. at 79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
112
Id. at 83.
113
See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 4, at 143; Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for
Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, Defendant Allocution, and the Crime Victims Rights’ Act, 26
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 439–40 (2008).
114
See generally CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 211 (2016) (noting that the victims’ rights
movement had significant influence over capital punishment in the 1980s and 1990s, although
since then it has been rivaled by new, anti-death penalty victims’ groups).
115
Procedurally, the victims’ rights movement has often focused on having judges
consider victim impact statements at sentencing. On a broader level, the movement has
minimized prisoners’ rights by equating justice for victims almost exclusively with retribution
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offenders must be treated harshly. By ironically framing dehumanizing
justice as the embodiment of compassion, the victims’ rights movement
exemplified the peculiarities of American law. The fundamental ethos of
justice in the United States appeared to be unmistakable punitiveness, as
illustrated by the proliferation of revealing mottos: “tough on crime,” “zero
tolerance,” “you do the crime, you do the time,” “an eye for an eye,” and
“just deserts.”116
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court made the Eighth Amendment the most
irrelevant when it was the most needed. In 1994, the U.S. prison population
topped the one million mark for the first time in history.117 In 2002, it reached
two million prisoners.118 As the Supreme Court countenanced extreme
punishments with no equivalent in the Western world, the extraordinary
divergence of American justice seemed undeniable.
However, one of the Justices, who had reasoned that the Eighth
Amendment barely protects defendants from ruthless prison terms,
eventually showed growing concern about the human toll of prison
population explosion.
Justice Anthony Kennedy denounced mass
incarceration in a 2003 speech at the American Bar Association (ABA).119
Noting that “countries such as England, Italy, France and Germany” have a
drastically lower incarceration rate than the United States, Kennedy
emphatically called for legislative reform: “It is a grave mistake to retain a
policy just because a court finds it constitutional . . . . A court decision does
not excuse the political branches or the public from the responsibility for
unjust laws.”120 Kennedy’s remarks suggested a realization that mass

and incapacitation, rather than rehabilitation and alternatives to incarceration. The movement
developed nationwide and grew influential in diverse types of cases. See, e.g., GARLAND,
supra note 4, at 143, 159, 169; Giannini, supra note 113, at 439–40; Kristin Henning, What’s
Wrong With Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court: Retributive Versus Rehabilitative Systems of
Justice, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1107 (2009). But see Giannini, supra note 113, at 473 (“[T]here are
circumstances at sentencing where victims express statements of mercy, forgiveness, or hope
for the defendant’s rehabilitation.”).
116
See generally JOUET, supra note 4, at 203.
117
U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1994 (1995), https://bjs.gov/content
/pub/pdf/Pi94.pdf [https://perma.cc/37RF-26W6]; see also Pierre Thomas, U.S. Prison
Population, Continuing Rapid Growth Since 80s, Surpasses 1 Million, WASH. POST, Oct. 28,
1994, at A3.
118
U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2002 (2003), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/p02.pdf [https://perma.cc/3F3D-LZRK]; see also Fox Butterfield, Prison
Rates Among Blacks Reach a Peak, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2003.
119
Anthony Kennedy, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address at the American
Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/viewspeech/sp_08-09-03 [https://perma.cc/ZF3Y-LT2Z].
120
Id.
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incarceration may not reflect legitimate penological goals, as illustrated by
his reference to James Whitman’s scholarly book Harsh Justice.121
“Professor Whitman concludes that the goal of the American corrections
system is to degrade and demean the prisoner,” Kennedy observed.122 “That
is a grave and serious charge. A purpose to degrade or demean individuals is
not acceptable in a society founded on respect for the inalienable rights of the
people.”123 Kennedy’s speech led to the creation of an ABA commission that
bore his name and that was tasked with investigating solutions to mass
incarceration.124
The Justice Kennedy Commission presented its
recommendations to the ABA the following year.125 Given the relative
absence of meaningful reform at either the state or federal level in the
aftermath of his speech and the commission’s report, it is plausible that
Kennedy came to see a greater role for the Eighth Amendment in addressing
mass incarceration.
Beginning in 2010, the Court expanded the Eighth Amendment’s scope
in three juvenile cases: Graham v. Florida, Miller v. Alabama, and
Montgomery v. Louisiana. Justice Kennedy not only was in the majority in
all of these cases; he authored the Graham decision that departed from the
rigid reasoning of his own influential plurality opinion in Harmelin by
distinguishing it as follows: “The present case involves an issue the Court
has not considered previously: a categorical challenge to a term-of-years
sentence [i.e., life without parole for a juvenile in a nonmurder case].”126
Kennedy also remarkably wrote: “The concept of proportionality is central
to the Eighth Amendment.”127 Graham consequently held that life
imprisonment without parole was “cruel and unusual punishment” for minors
convicted of nonhomicide offenses. The dissenters protested that the

121

Id.; see also WHITMAN, supra note 4.
Kennedy, Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting, supra note 119.
123
Id.
124
James Podgers, Prison Country: ABA to Study Issues Justice Kennedy Raised at
Annual Meeting, 89 ABA JOURNAL 1, 87 (2003).
125
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION, REPORTS WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Aug. 2004), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_
kennedy_JusticeKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/85Y
T-GCH4] [hereinafter “JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION REPORT”].
126
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010); see also Barkow, supra note 31, at 49
(discussing Graham’s historical significance as the first decision to depart from Harmelin’s
logic).
127
Graham, 560 U.S. at 59 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)
(alteration in original)).
122
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majority had disregarded stare decisis and Harmelin’s “death is different”
doctrine that limited proportionality review to capital cases.128
Harmelin was again at issue in Miller, a subsequent challenge to life
without parole for all juveniles.129 In the course of oral arguments, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor asked Bryan Stevenson, the prominent human rights
attorney who represented Evan Miller, “[H]ow do you deal with
Harmelin . . . if Harmelin says we don’t look at individualized
sentencing?”130 Stevenson tellingly responded, “It’s a challenge, and I
concede that,” before suggesting that the Court follow the Graham
standard.131 As Harmelin would indeed have posed an obstacle to the
juvenile’s claim, John C. Neiman, Jr., who appeared on behalf of Alabama,
urged the Court to follow that precedent during his oral argument: “Harmelin
effectively sets a bright line here such [] that individualized sentencing is
only required in [] a death penalty case.”132
Justice Elena Kagan’s majority opinion in Miller ultimately dismissed
as “myopic” the claim that Harmelin barred relief under the Eighth
Amendment: “Harmelin had nothing to do with children and did not purport
to apply its holding to the sentencing of juvenile offenders. . . . [A]
sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children.”133 Miller
held that life without parole could not be a mandatory sentence for a murder
perpetrated by a juvenile.134 Four years later, in Montgomery v. Louisiana,
the Justices found that Miller had announced a substantive constitutional rule
that should apply retroactively, opening the door for numerous juveniles
serving mandatory life terms to seek resentencing.135
Graham, Miller, and Montgomery were partly the fruit of the Court’s
abolition of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons, a 2005
precedent.136 Roper was itself predicated on Atkins v. Virginia, a 2003
decision abolishing the death penalty for the “mentally retarded.”137 Atkins
and Roper both held that capital punishment should be reserved for the most
culpable offenders, a category excluding juveniles and the mentally disabled.
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Id. at 99–100, 103–05 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
130
Oral Argument at 8:51, Miller, 567 U.S. 460. (No. 10-9646), https://www.oyez.org/
cases/2011/10-9646 [https://perma.cc/AL37-XLHJ].
131
Id.
132
Id. at 38:30.
133
Miller, 567 U.S. at 481.
134
Id. at 489.
135
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016).
136
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005).
137
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002).
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Atkins and Roper initially appeared to confirm the enduring principle that the
death penalty is the only type of punishment that must be proportional to
culpability under the Eighth Amendment, as death is “qualitatively” different
from incarceration.138
Nevertheless, in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery the Court analogized
life without parole to the death penalty given that both punishments condemn
people to death behind bars.139 Citing neurological and behavioral science
demonstrating that teenagers’ brains are not fully developed, the Court
reasoned that the diminished decision-making ability of juveniles mitigates
their culpability.140 In Graham and its progeny, “death is different” may thus
have given way to a new principle: “juveniles are different.”
Yet a broader evolution suggests that a paradigm shift in American
society may not be narrowly limited to juveniles’ rights. Alongside state
sentencing reforms and a rising social debate about ending mass
incarceration,141 the Supreme Court appears increasingly concerned about
dignitary harms in the penal system.142 In particular, beside the Graham and
Montgomery decisions, Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in
Brown v. Plata concluding that abusive conditions of incarceration violate
“human dignity.” 143 This pattern seemed to confirm Kennedy’s concern
about the tension between human dignity and harsh prison sentences, which

138
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995–96 (1991) (plurality opinion). In practice,
“death is different” has not been synonymous with a thorough review of each death row
prisoner’s culpability and mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court and lower appellate
courts have been disinclined to overturn death sentences, instead deferring to state authorities’
efforts to impose capital punishment. See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION:
AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 267 (2010) (describing how in the mid1990s “the Court made it clear that it would no longer examine case-specific proportionality,
review capital sentencing patterns for evidence of disparity, nor require state appellate courts
to conduct comparative proportionality review”).
139
See generally Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 474–75 (2012).
140
See generally id. at 471–73; Steinberg, supra note 15, at 513.
141
See infra Section III.
142
Dignity has gained importance in other areas of constitutional law. See Leslie Meltzer
Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 PENN. L. REV. 169, 169 (2011); e.g., Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (emphasizing that same-sex marriage is a constitutional
right required by “equal dignity in the eyes of the law”); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S.
744, 771 (2013) (finding that the Defense of Marriage Act “interfere[s] with the equal dignity
of same-sex marriages”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 574, 575 (2003) (holding
that criminalizing intimate homosexual relations is an affront to “dignity”); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(reasoning that abortion is a constitutional right, under certain conditions, partly because it
reflects “choices central to dignity and personal autonomy”).
143
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011).
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he had signaled in his 2003 speech at the American Bar Association144 and
his endorsement of the ABA commission on criminal justice reform.145 But
Kennedy was not the lone conservative-leaning member of the Court willing
to expand the Eighth Amendment’s scope. Strikingly, Chief Justice John
Roberts concurred with the judgment in Graham146 and was in the majority
in Montgomery,147 although he dissented in Miller.148 These developments
demonstrated that, notwithstanding the Court’s historic reluctance to enforce
the Eighth Amendment, its interpretation is not set in stone. Moreover,
historical and comparative evidence suggests that the evolution of Western
sensibilities extends far beyond the idiosyncrasies of individual Supreme
Court Justices.149
II. CONVERGENCE: AMERICAN PENAL PHILOSOPHY INCHES TOWARD
HUMANITARIAN NORMS PREVALENT IN OTHER WESTERN
DEMOCRACIES
If mass incarceration in the United States long exemplified divergence,
American justice may now be converging toward penal norms that have
limited punitiveness in other Western democracies: dignity, proportionality,
legitimacy, and rehabilitation. Because the Supreme Court recognized these
sentencing principles in its landmark juvenile decisions, few scholars have
focused on how these principles are not age-dependent and could extend to
adult prison cases.150 Indeed, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery have so far
precipitated breakthroughs in juvenile justice reform—not adult criminal
sentencing—in diverse states nationwide.151 Jonathan Simon is a notable
exception in the academy, as he observed how Graham’s recognition of
dignity principles may ultimately influence Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence and state laws concerning adults.152 But this development is
unlikely to occur, unless the Justices and more experts take a broader view
144

Kennedy, supra note 119.
JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 125.
146
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 86 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment).
147
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016).
148
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 493 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
149
See infra notes 434–437 and accompanying text.
150
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
151
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
152
Simon, supra note 16, at 285–86; see also Berry, supra note 16, at 1109 (suggesting
how courts could conceptualize an Eighth Amendment safeguard against life without parole
for all prisoners in the aftermath of Graham); O’Hear, supra note 16, at 1138 (examining how
the Justices’ “approach leaves room for lower courts to begin the process of extending Graham
and Miller and developing principled limitations on the imposition of [life without parole] on
adult offenders”).
145
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of Graham and its progeny. So far these cases have primarily been reduced
to a narrow “juveniles are different” doctrine that effectively pits children
against adults by suggesting that the former should be treated mercifully and
the latter mercilessly. From this angle, the Graham line of cases could
cement and legitimize grossly excessive prison terms for adults, rather than
challenge their constitutionality. However, a closer reading of these
decisions reveals significant parallels with sentencing principles that have
protected both juveniles and adults from draconian prison terms in modern
Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.153
Scholarly research on international convergence in Eighth Amendment
decisions has largely concentrated on a different matter: the Supreme Court’s
citation of unratified international treaties and foreign law as persuasive
authority.154 But the Justices did not simply conclude that inflicting certain
ruthless punishments on juveniles violates international human rights
standards.155 In this section, we will see that convergence has also been at
the level of penal philosophy and has not been fully one-sided. The European
Court of Human Rights remarkably cited Graham as persuasive authority
when prohibiting, for all persons, lifelong incarceration without the
possibility of release in Europe.156
Insofar as the Eighth Amendment is a microcosm of American penal
philosophy, our analysis of its evolution will lay the groundwork to explore
broader patterns of convergence in the next section. Drawing upon the
principles announced in Graham and its progeny, twenty-two states and the
District of Columbia have abolished life without parole categorically for
juveniles, granting them more rights than under the Eighth Amendment.157
State actors have equally been debating whether to put an end to the mass
incarceration era and its punitiveness.158 These developments may reflect a
long-term trend in the Western world toward reducing the scope of offenders
and offenses eligible for the harshest sentences.159
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See generally JOUET, supra note 4, at 194–96, 218–21.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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Id.
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Vinter, ¶ 73 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010)).
157
CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, States that Ban Life without Parole
for Children, supra note 14; see also CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH,
RIGHTING WRONGS, supra note 13.
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See infra Section III.
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Id.
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A. HUMAN DIGNITY

Dignity has emerged as an increasingly influential constitutional
principle in Europe,160 America,161 and beyond,162 although it has distant
historical roots.163 While it is a multifaceted concept with competing
definitions,164 one salient understanding of human dignity rests on the
intrinsic worth of the person.165 As Neomi Rao describes, “the dignity that
arises from one’s humanity is the most universal and open understanding of
the term. This dignity indicates that worth and regard arise in each individual
simply by virtue of being human.”166 In Xavier Bioy’s analytical framework,
the rising importance of dignity reflects a “hierarchisation of values” placing
respect for the human person as the foremost consideration,167 thereby
explaining why dignity is deemed inviolable and inalienable.
Émile Durkheim, the French sociologist, observed over a century ago
that the norm of dignity could attenuate the harshness of punishments by
leading people to identify with offenders at a human level.168 Durkheim
traced this development to the long-term societal evolution from pre-modern
or authoritarian societies, such as absolute monarchies and theocracies,

160
See generally LA DIGNITÉ sAISIE PAR LES JUGES EN EUROPE (Laurence BurgorgueLarsen ed., 2010).
161
Henry, supra note 142, at 169 (presenting historical and empirical evidence of the
Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on the principle of dignity).
162
See Luís Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in
Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 331
(2012) (describing the growing weight of dignity as a principle in international courts,
domestic courts in Western democracies, including the United States, as well as the legal
systems of developing nations).
163
See generally Xavier Bioy, Le concept de dignité, in LA DIGNITÉ SAISIE PAR LES JUGES
EN EUROPE 13, supra note 160, at 26–32 (describing the historical origins of dignity, from
Antiquity to the Middle Ages and modern times); Simon, supra note 16, at 287 (discussing
the diverse roots of dignity in Enlightenment philosophy, Greco-Roman antiquity, and
Abrahamic religious traditions).
164
See generally GEORGE KATEB, HUMAN DIGNITY ix (2011) (acknowledging the
difficulty in defining the concept of dignity); Henry, supra note 142, at 169 (2011) (noting
that the principle of dignity is invoked by both liberal and conservative Supreme Court
Justices); Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 183 (2011) (describing conflicting definitions of dignity).
165
See, e.g., KATEB, supra note 164, at ix; Bioy, supra note 163, at 24–33; Laurence
Burgorgue-Larsen, La dignité dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de
l’homme, in LA DIGNITÉ SAISIE PAR LES JUGES EN EUROPE 55, supra note 160, at 57; Simon,
supra note 16, at 287–88; Rao, supra note 164, at 196.
166
Rao, supra note 164, at 196.
167
Bioy, supra note 163, at 24 (author’s translation).
168
Durkheim, supra note 26, at 65.

730

JOUET

[Vol. 109

toward secularized liberal democracies.169 Under Durkheim’s theory, the
bulk of offenses in pre-modern or authoritarian regimes are considered
affronts to God, the monarch or society itself.170 Liberal democracies are
founded on different premises that lead them to mainly penalize offenses
perpetrated against individuals.171
This societal shift toward
individualization was not limited to victimhood, but also encompassed
greater empathy toward the individual offender. As Durkheim described (in
dated yet prescient language), in a liberal democracy “[w]hat concerns man
concerns us all; because we are all men. The feelings protecting human
dignity thus are personally dear to us.”172 From this perspective, valuing the
lives of both the victim and offender is not mutually exclusive, as it would
be “a contradiction to avenge the human dignity violated in the person of the
victim, by violating it in the person of the culprit.”173
Durkheim’s theory of dignity, announced in 1900, finds support in
growing reservations toward punishments that simply negate the value of
prisoners’ lives.174 Two-thirds of all countries worldwide have abolished
capital punishment in law or practice, a steady reformist trend since the early
twentieth century.175 Even though this shift has various underlying causes,
such as the geopolitical influence of European countries that made abolition
a cornerstone of their foreign policy,176 it partly reflects an evolution in
Western sensibilities. With the exception of the United States, all modern
Western democracies—European nations, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand—have abolished the death penalty and identify it as an inherent
human rights violation.177 In their view, killing incapacitated prisoners who
169

See generally id.
Id. at 74–77, 87, 91–95.
171
Id. at 81, 86, 91–95.
172
Id. at 88 (author’s translation).
173
Id. at 90.
174
Michel Foucault called into question Durkheim’s theory by arguing that criminal
punishments actually evolve toward insidious forms of social control that are not synonymous
with valuing prisoners’ lives. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR 31 (Gallimard ed.
2010) (1975). For a discussion of Foucault’s theory, see infra note 432 and accompanying
text.
175
See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS 42
(2017); DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., ABOLITIONIST AND RETENTIONIST COUNTRIES, https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries?scid=30&amp;did=140 [https://
perma.cc/PQ2H-RCZR] (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
176
Western European nations notably convinced former Soviet bloc nations to abolish the
death penalty as a condition of entry into the Council of Europe and European Union. See
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 36–37
(2003).
177
JOUET, supra note 4, at 218–24; ZIMRING, supra note 176, at 27, 39, 46–47.
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could be imprisoned is an affront to human dignity.178 They normally refuse
to extradite arrestees to countries retaining the death penalty, including
America, unless they receive assurances that extraditees will not face
execution.179 Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights forbids its
forty-seven member states to conduct any extradition that may lead to the
death penalty.180
Besides the decline in capital punishment, growing reservations toward
life sentences or imprisonment per se appear consistent with Durkheim’s
theory. Europe has gone the farthest in the West in refraining from
condemning prisoners to die or spend decades behind bars.181 And when
European offenders do face life imprisonment, their sentences typically have
a realistic possibility of parole or executive pardon.182 As early as 1977, the
German Constitutional Court illustratively barred mandatory life sentences
because that punishment “strikes at the very heart of human
dignity . . . without regard to the development of [the prisoner’s]
personality.”183 This relative consensus culminated in the European Court of
Human Rights’ 2013 Vinter decision, which held by a 16-1 vote that member
178

Id.
France notably refused to provide legal assistance to U.S. authorities seeking the death
penalty against Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen involved in the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. ZIMRING, supra note 176, at 42–45; see also United States v. Burns,
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 284–85 (Can.) (Canada Supreme Court decision refusing to extradite
suspects to the United States if they could be executed); Robert Harvie & Hamar Foster,
Shocks and Balances: United States v. Burns, Fine-Tuning Canadian Extradition Law and the
Future of the Death Penalty, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 293 (2004); John Kifner, France Will Not
Extradite If Death Penalty Is Possible, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2001, at B4 (describing France’s
refusal to extradite American accused of murdering an abortion doctor, unless U.S. authorities
guaranteed he would not face capital punishment).
180
Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶
120, 123 (2010) (reasoning that the death penalty inherently violates the European Convention
on Human Rights’ right to life and right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading
punishments, thereby precluding member states from extraditing any prisoner who may face
the death penalty); Al Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 456, 576–79, 598
(2015) (concluding that Poland violated the European Convention on Human Rights by
transferring to American authorities a member of Al Qaeda who may be executed by the
United States).
181
Simon, supra note 16, at 285. For instance, life without parole has not garnered
substantial judicial attention in Australia, unlike in Europe. See Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Life Without
Parole in Australia, in LIFE IMPRISONMENT: A GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS 75, 76 (Dirk
van Zyl Smit & Catherine Appleton eds., 2019).
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Vinter, ¶ 68; Simon, supra note 16, at 285 (both discussing the state of the law in
European nations).
183
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [German Constitutional Court] June 21, 1977, 45
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 187, 245 (F.R.G.), quoted in
Nilsen, supra note 31, at 164.
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states cannot sentence prisoners to lifelong incarceration without a genuine
possibility of release.184 The Judges quasi-unanimously found that such a
punishment was dehumanizing, running afoul of Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights:185 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”186
Reservations toward lifelong imprisonment are not limited to Europe,
as they appear to reflect a broader evolution in the Western world. In Canada,
the longest sentence one may receive for first-degree murder is life with the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years,187 but it can be imposed
consecutively for multiple homicides following a 2011 reform intended to
“toughen” Canadian justice, such as by leading to seventy-five years before
eligibility for parole for a triple homicide.188 Nevertheless, these cases are
rare189 and the Canadian penal system does not routinely apply very lengthy
prison terms.190 Canada’s incarceration rate has remained rather steady since
the 1950s191 and is nearly one-sixth that of the United States.192 Mass
incarceration also does not exist in Australia and New Zealand, although
local “tough on crime” movements have had a greater impact than in Canada

184

Vinter, ¶¶ 119–22, 139.
Id.
186
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
187
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, art. 745.
188
Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act, S.C.
2011, c. 5 (Can.); see also Alexandra Pester, Canada’s Longest Recent Sentences and the
Questions and Controversies of Consecutive Life Sentences, THE COURT (Mar. 21, 2017),
http://www.thecourt.ca/canadas-longest-recent-sentences-questions-controversies-consecutiv
e-life-sentences/ [https://perma.cc/QAA5-JN93]. Another Canadian reform proposal aimed to
eliminate parole altogether for certain murderers, yet it had not passed as of October 2019.
Sean Fine, Tories to Table Life in Prison Without Parole, Shifting Legal Landscape, GLOBE
AND MAIL, (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/tories-to-tablelife-in-prison-without-parole-shifting-legal-landscape/article22646714/ [https://perma.cc/BH
5S-78GQ].
189
Pester, supra note 188.
190
See Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Weathering the Storm? Testing LongStanding Canadian Sentencing Policy in the Twenty-First Century, 45 CRIME & JUST. 359,
379–81 (2016) [hereinafter “Weathering the Storm?”]; Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie
Webster, Countering Punitiveness: Understanding Stability in Canada’s Imprisonment Rate,
40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 325, 330-32 (2006); Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob,
Punitive Trends and Stable Imprisonment Rates in Canada, 36 CRIME & JUST. 297, 307-11
(2007).
191
Doob & Webster, Weathering the Storm?, supra note 190, at 361 fig. 1; see also
WORLD PRISON BRIEF, CANADA, http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/canada [https://perma
.cc/ZH9Y-9EAY] (last visited Jan. 10, 2018).
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See generally WORLD PRISON BRIEF, supra note 39.
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in expanding these nations’ prison populations.193 Still, Australia and New
Zealand’s incarceration rates are over three times lower than in America.194
Australia permits life without parole,195 yet data suggest that authorities apply
this punishment far more sparingly than in the United States.196 In 2010,
New Zealand adopted three strikes legislation encompassing life without
parole for certain homicides, but in 2016 its Court of Appeal upheld a major
challenge to the statute’s application in two high-profile murder cases.197 The
Court emphasized that the provision of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
barring excessive prison terms lists them “alongside torture, cruelty and
conduct with degrading effect”,198 and that lengthy incarceration must satisfy
the Act’s additional provision protecting “the inherent dignity of the
person.”199
In contrast, life without parole is an ordinary facet of contemporary
American justice. The number of prisoners receiving this punishment has
grown exponentially to approximately 50,000 people, a record level in U.S.
history.200 Life without parole may appear relatively atypical considering
that the United States has 2.1 million prisoners,201 but it is the tip of the
iceberg in a penal system where dehumanizing punishments have become
normalized.202
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WORLD PRISON BRIEF, AUSTRALIA, http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/australia
[https://perma.cc/T94M-ESV8] (last visited Jan. 10, 2018); WORLD PRISON BRIEF, NEW
ZEALAND, http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/new-zealand [https://perma.cc/4QT7-9CYY
] (last visited Jan. 10, 2018).
194
WORLD PRISON BRIEF, supra note 39.
195
James C. Oleson, Habitual Criminal Legislation in New Zealand: Three Years of Three
Strikes, 48 AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND J. CRIMINOLOGY 277, 281–83 (2015).
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Fitz-Gibbon, supra note 181, at 78–80.
197
The New Zealand Court of Appeal did not bar life without parole per se, although it
found it was unjustified in two murder cases that garnered media attention. R v. Harrison
(2016) NZCA 381, ¶¶ 127–33, 144–49; see also First Appeal Challenging Three-Strikes Law
Dismissed, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Aug. 10, 2016.
198
R v. Harrison (2016) NZCA 381, ¶ 79; see also New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
§ 9 (“Everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or
disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.”).
199
R v. Harrison (2016) NZCA 381, ¶ 80 (quoting New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
§ 23(5)).
200
ASHLEY NELLIS, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA,
SENTENCING PROJECT 5 (2013); see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat, Introduction:
Lives on the Line: From Capital Punishment to Life without Parole, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE:
AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY, supra note 16, at 1–3.
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However, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the protection of
human dignity is a guiding principle to interpret the Eighth Amendment. 203
While the Justices have often been disinclined to apply this principle, they
have proved increasingly able to recognize human dignity in juveniles. In
1989, during the same time period as when it summarily affirmed the
constitutionality of extreme prison terms,204 the Court held by a 5-4 vote that
it was constitutional to execute teenage offenders.205 Conversely, its 2005
majority opinion abolishing the juvenile death penalty in Roper underscored
that “[b]y protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth
Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all
persons.”206 The Justices added that the purpose of the United States
Constitution was “to secure individual freedom and preserve human
dignity.”207 Although Graham, Miller, and Montgomery did not specifically
use the term “dignity,” these decisions restricting the applicability of life
without parole are also premised on the intrinsic worth of children’s lives. In
all of these cases, the Court described the defendants’ personal backgrounds
and mitigating circumstances to demonstrate that lower courts had
discounted these aspects of their humanity when sentencing them to die in
prison.208
Yet human dignity is not an age-dependent principle. A person cannot
forfeit his or her dignity by turning eighteen years old and entering adulthood,
as dignity is rooted in the inherent worth of a human being.209 The norm of
dignity that seemed to influence the Court’s reasoning in juvenile cases may
therefore be logically extended to those of adult prisoners. Jonathan Simon
has notably posited that the Court’s juvenile decisions may have broader
implications in developing “dignity as a value in our public law.”210
Acknowledging that “[t]he road from Graham to any eventual abolition of
[life without parole] may be a long one,” Simon advanced that this paradigm
shift may depend on “the ability of criminal justice officials, criminologists,

203
The Justices announced this standard in Trop, an influential 1958 decision. Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”).
204
See supra Section I.
205
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005).
206
Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
207
Id. at 578.
208
See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725–26, 736–37 (2016); Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–79 (2012); Graham v. Florida 560 U.S. 48, 53, 79 (2010).
209
See supra notes 165–167, 172 and accompanying text.
210
Simon, supra note 16, at 285–86.
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and lawyers to promote a commitment to dignity within penality itself.” 211
Other scholars have similarly suggested that enhancing the value of dignity
in American justice may be a necessary step to move away from unduly harsh
punishments.212
B. PROPORTIONALITY OF PUNISHMENT TO CULPABILITY

A court can hardly assess whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual”
in the abstract and without any frame of reference. Proportionality has
historically been a key consideration in theories of punishment examining
whether a given sentence fits the crime.213 Under these circumstances,
eviscerating the principle of proportionality from the Eighth Amendment
amounts to practically removing the amendment from the Constitution. It is
no coincidence that the Eighth Amendment became a dead letter for prisoners
precisely during the three decades when the Supreme Court reasoned that no
proportionality requirement effectively exists except in capital cases.214 In
all likelihood, the Court would have rejected the juveniles’ claims in Graham,
Miller, and Montgomery if it had not circumvented the “death is different”
doctrine and reinvigorated the proportionality principle that it had last
applied in Solem back in 1983.215
Meanwhile, proportionality has been among the factors that have
checked excessive punishments in Europe, as France’s case exemplifies.
French politicians have clashed over whether the national penal system
should emphasize repression or rehabilitation.216 Nicolas Sarkozy notably
cast himself as a law and order conservative.217 Under his oversight as
Minister of the Interior and then President, “[t]he rate of imprisonment rose
from 79.2 per 100,000 inhabitants to 99.2” from 2002 to 2012.218 As of 2018,
the French incarceration rate was still approximately 104 per 100,000

211

Id.
See, e.g., WHITMAN, supra note 4 (identifying the greater weight of dignity in
continental Europe as a key factor behind its more moderate penal systems).
213
See generally Melissa Hamilton, Extreme Prison Sentences: Legal and Normative
Consequences, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 59, 77–78 (2016); Youngjae Lee, Why Proportionality
Matters, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1835 (2012).
214
See supra Section I.
215
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 277 (1983); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that “a punishment is ‘excessive’ and
unconstitutional if it . . . is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime”).
216
Jacqueline Hodgson & Laurène Soubise, Understanding the Sentencing Process in
France, 45 CRIME & JUST. 221, 221–23, 236–37 (2016).
217
See generally id. at 236.
218
Id. at 223.
212

736

JOUET

[Vol. 109

inhabitants.219 Despite these fluctuations, France’s penal system has
remained very moderate compared to the United States, whose incarceration
rate is over six times higher.220 The number of life sentences (with the
possibility of parole) imposed in France per year also remained steady under
Sarkozy’s tenure.221 The difference between America and France reflects
multiple factors, ranging from distinct historical circumstances222 to a more
centrist conception of conservatism in modern-day Europe.223 But a much
greater commitment to proportionality in French sentencing is part of the
equation. The French Constitutional Court recognized in 2005 that
individualized punishment is enshrined in the nation’s constitutional
values.224 Moreover, a vast segment of French politicians and legal
practitioners, including prosecutors and judges, have long embraced the
substantive analysis of an offender’s individual mitigating and aggravating
circumstances so that the sentence fits the crime.225
Similarly, proportionality in punishment has remained a core principle
in Canada, notwithstanding an influential “tough on crime” reform
movement. Under Prime Minister Stephen Harper of the Conservative Party,
which governed Canada from 2006 to 2015, punitiveness became a central
aspect of political rhetoric.226 Canada further adopted legislation instituting
relatively harsh mandatory minimum sentences or restrictions on parole. 227
Nevertheless, Canada’s incarceration rate did not increase significantly,
partly because judges and other legal actors were skeptical of this punitive
streak and resisted efforts to abandon individual sentencing.228 As in France
under President Sarkozy,229 assessing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances to apply a punishment proportional to culpability remained a
key value in Canada’s penal system. Comparably, in a seminal decision
concerning two prominent murder cases, the New Zealand Court of Appeal
219

WORLD PRISON BRIEF, supra note 39.
Id.
221
See Marion Vannier, A Right to Hope? Life Imprisonment in France, in LIFE
IMPRISONMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 181, at 205.
222
See generally WHITMAN, supra note 4.
223
See generally KINGDON, supra note 43, at 55, 72.
224
Hodgson & Soubise, supra note 216, at 240–41.
225
Vannier, supra note 221, at 200, 201, 207; Hodgson & Soubise, supra note 216, at 242,
254.
226
See Doob & Webster, Weathering the Storm?, supra note 190, at 410–11.
227
Id. at 379–83.
228
Id. at 397–410; see also Anthony Gray, Mandatory Sentencing Around the World and
the Need for Reform, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 391, 392-96 (2017) (discussing Canadian
Supreme Court decisions finding mandatory sentences unconstitutional).
229
See generally Hodgson & Soubise, supra note 216, at 242, 254.
220
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held that applying life without parole under a recently enacted three-strikes
statute would be excessive given the defendants’ individual circumstances
(age, mental health, actions, etc.),230 and may violate the national Bill of
Rights Act’s ban on “disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.”231
This is a far cry from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Harmelin line of cases,
which rejected such substantive analysis and ratified the summary infliction
of blatantly disproportional sentences like lifelong incarceration for petty
recidivists.232
It must be noted that these decisions’ rejection of
proportionality review scarcely stem from an innately distinct conception of
constitutionalism in the United States next to France, Canada, and other
Western nations. One should be wary of essentialism when analyzing the
evolution of American penal norms, which can reflect human agency and
historical contingency.233 Indeed, the Eighth Amendment has encompassed
a proportionality principle in other contexts for decades—a double standard
suggesting a choice by certain Justices to exclude prison sentences from
review. As Justice White’s dissent in Harmelin observed, “Justice Scalia’s
position that the Eighth Amendment addresses only modes or methods of
punishment is quite inconsistent with our capital punishment cases, which do
not outlaw death as a mode or method of punishment, but instead put limits
on its application.”234 Justice Souter added that it would be “anomalous” to
“suggest that the [text of the] Eighth Amendment makes proportionality
review applicable in the context of bail and fines but not in the context of
other forms of punishment, such as imprisonment.”235
The Court eventually chose to apply proportionality review to life
without parole in juvenile cases.236 But it did so using broad language: “The
concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment. Embodied in
the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments is the ‘precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
230

See generally R v. Harrison (2016) NZCA 381, ¶¶ 127–33, 144–58.
Id. at 79–84, 101, 107, 111, 114, 119–22; see also New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990 § 9.
232
See supra Section I.
233
See infra notes 331–339 and accompanying text.
234
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1018 (1991) (plurality opinion) (White, J.,
dissenting).
235
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 33 (2003) (plurality opinion) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983)); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009
(White, J., dissenting) (“The language of the Amendment does not refer to proportionality in
so many words, but it does forbid ‘excessive’ fines, a restraint that suggests that a
determination of excessiveness should be based at least in part on whether the fine imposed is
disproportionate to the crime committed.”).
236
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010).
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[the] offense.’”237 Additionally, the Court distanced itself from Harmelin’s
unpersuasive “death is different” doctrine by analogizing life without parole
to the death penalty since both condemn people to die in prison.238 These
developments suggest relative convergence with other Western democracies,
where the proportionality of punishment is an influential norm.239
Going forward, it would be incoherent for the U.S. Supreme Court to
strictly limit proportionality review to juvenile cases, as this principle does
not become irrelevant the moment when people turn eighteen. Because youth
is a mitigating circumstance, a sentence imposed on an adult may reasonably
be longer than for an adolescent convicted of the same crime, yet that
sentence must still fit the crime. In the absence of a proportionality principle
applying to adult prisoners, their sentences may continue to dramatically
exceed culpability. Alongside life without parole, mass incarceration has led
to the normalization of “virtual life” sentences, namely, prison terms that
stretch far beyond the convicted person’s life expectancy.240 Certain courts
have thus inflicted sentences spanning hundreds of years, as in the case of a
defendant who received 290 years in prison for robberies that netted him
approximately $3,000.241
C. LEGITIMACY OF PENAL PURPOSE

The Graham line of cases acknowledged a longstanding principle: harsh
punishments that serve no legitimate penological purpose are suspect. This
principle is tied to the proportionality of punishment, yet adds another
analytical dimension by assessing whether the state’s goal is to oppress the
prisoner by inflicting ruthless treatment. Cesare Beccaria, the Italian
Enlightenment philosopher, prioritized this principle in his magnum opus On
Crimes and Punishment, a trailblazing work in criminology that America’s
Founding Fathers and other prominent thinkers read.242 “[E]very act of
authority between one man and another that does not derive from absolute
necessity is tyrannical,” Beccaria wrote, cautioning governments against
resorting to excessive punishments.243

237

Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (alteration in original)).
See generally Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 474–75 (2012).
239
See supra notes 224–231 and accompanying text.
240
Hamilton, supra note 213, at 107.
241
Id. at 110–11, 117.
242
HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA 118 (1976); John D. Bessler,
Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, and the Abolition
Movement, 4 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 212–13 (2009).
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CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 8 (David Young trans., 1986).
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Despite influencing the likes of Thomas Jefferson, John Adams,
Thomas Paine, John Hancock, and Benjamin Rush,244 Beccaria’s principles
may have had less concrete influence on the text of the Eighth Amendment 245
than on the law of another nation shaped by Enlightenment ideas: France.246
In 1789, its revolutionaries inserted in their Declaration of Human Rights and
of the Citizen an article stipulating that “[t]he Law must prescribe only the
punishments that are strictly and evidently necessary,”247 echoing Beccaria’s
definition of a legitimate punishment.248 Modern French law has adopted the
1789 Declaration as part of its constitutional system.249 According to William
Stuntz, the eminent American scholar, France’s Declaration has provided its
democracy with more substantive criminal protections than the U.S. Bill of
Rights, which primarily consists of procedural safeguards.250 Banning
punishments that are not “strictly and evidently necessary” (or “strictly and
obviously necessary,” depending on the translation) under the French
Declaration entails more lenity than banning only “cruel and unusual
punishments” under the Eighth Amendment.251 Stuntz concludes his
comparison by stating that “American law knows nothing like these
substantive limits on government power.”252 But does it?
Stuntz’s conclusion appears to be an overstatement, as he himself noted
that America had incarceration levels comparable to those of European
nations until the 1970s.253 Lenity was not enshrined in the Eighth
Amendment’s text as much as in the French Declaration, which advances that
excessive punishments are illegitimate; yet Stuntz’s own magisterial study

244

Bessler, supra note 242, at 19–28.
STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 74–79.
246
On the influence of Beccaria on French révolutionnaires, see CÉCILE BARBERGER,
DROIT PÉNAL 5 (1997); JEAN-YVES LE NAOUR, HISTOIRE DE L’ABOLITION DE LA PEINE DE MORT
47, 53 (2011); Robert Badinter, Préface, in CESARE BECCARIA, DES DÉLITS ET DES PEINES i, ii
(Maurice Chevallier trans., 1991).
247
See generally Hodgson & Soubise, supra note 216, at 240 (quoting DÉCLARATION DES
DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN art. VIII (Fr. 1789)). “Déclaration des droits de l’homme
et du citoyen” is either translatable as “Declaration of Human Rights and of the Citizen” or
“Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.” The former translation is arguably more
applicable to modern French language.
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BECCARIA, supra note 243, at 8.
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Hodgson & Soubise, supra note 216, at 241; see also Pasquale Pasquino, Classifying
Constitutions: Preliminary Conceptual Analysis, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 999, 1001 (2013)
(discussing the incorporation of the Declaration into French constitutionalism).
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Id. at 77–78.
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Id. at 78.
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reminds us that American justice often applied punishment “sparingly” prior
to the mass incarceration era.254
The understanding of a legitimate punishment in modern America and
France differs partly because the U.S. penal system has grown more
populistic.255 For instance, American judges and prosecutors are usually
elected at the local level, although judicial elections are rare by international
standards.256 While this institutional peculiarity long preceded the advent of
mass incarceration,257 it enabled elected judges and prosecutors to campaign
by supporting ultra-punitive policies after the “tough on crime” movement
emerged in the 1970s.258 By contrast, French judges and prosecutors are
trained civil servants, who are less receptive to political pressure and more
driven by policy goals established in consultation with other national
experts.259 The same can be said about other Western societies like Canada,
where non-elected judges have resisted political pressure to sentence
prisoners more harshly.260
From a populist conception of democracy, the greater receptiveness of
U.S. officials to public calls for harshness may appear more legitimate than
legal systems where experts are mainly in charge. Nevertheless, the
American public may be less supportive of draconian punishments than it
seems, as many U.S. citizens are ill-informed about criminal justice policy or
are swayed by misleading fear-mongering.261
254

Id. at 2, 31, 55, 131, 152, 311.
Regarding the broader populist strand in American political culture, see JOUET, supra
note 4, at 43–79, 200–03; LIPSET, supra note 43, at 19, 46.
256
See generally Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Judicial
Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1351, 1351 n.3 (2010).
In France, lower court commercial and labor judges are elected professionals, although they
lack jurisdiction over criminal cases. Amalia D. Kessler, Marginalization and Myth: The
Corporatist Roots of France’s Forgotten Elective Judiciary, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 679, 681–83
(2010).
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The legitimacy of judicial elections has been a matter of debate in American society
since at least the early nineteenth century, well before the emergence of modern prison
population explosion. See generally Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective
Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 714–25 (1995).
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See generally Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, in
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 57, 77 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
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the “tough on crime” movement. See generally David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political
Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647 (2017).
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See Doob & Webster, Weathering the Storm?, supra note 190, at 405–10.
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See generally JOUET, supra note 4, at 201–03; John Gramlich, Voters’ Perceptions of
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Furthermore, a draconian punishment is not constitutionally legitimate
simply because it might be politically popular. Michael Tonry has described
how a factor behind the United States’ mass incarceration phenomenon has
been extraordinary deference to “whatever punishments policy makers
specified, whether or not those policies respected retributive principles or
ideas about proportionality, and whether those policies were adopted for
substantive reasons or to demonstrate politicians were tough on crime.”262
But the Eighth Amendment cannot persuasively be reduced to the tautology
that if the authorities or the public support a particular punishment, then it
cannot be “cruel and unusual.” If so, why have an Eighth Amendment?
Rather, assessing the constitutional legitimacy of a punishment entails
assessing its penological purpose.263
This is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Graham, holding that
“[a] sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature
disproportionate to the offense,”264 thereby inching toward the Beccarian
legitimacy principle recognized in France. Firstly, the Justices concluded
that the traditional penal objective of deterrence has diminished weight in
juvenile cases in light of neurological and behavioral science showing that
juveniles are less capable than adults to grasp the consequences of their
actions, leading to impetuous criminal behavior that cannot readily be
deterred.265 Secondly, the traditional penal objective of retribution has
diminished legitimacy in juvenile cases because it “relates to an offender’s
blameworthiness,” which the “immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity” of
youth tend to mitigate.266
Thirdly, permanent incapacitation is a
constitutionally suspect objective given evidence that teenagers have
significant potential for rehabilitation.267 Under these circumstances, the

-reality/ [https://perma.cc/7CXA-8LXT]; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 362
(1972) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]he question with which we must deal is
not whether a substantial proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine that
capital punishment is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so in the light of
all information presently available.”).
262
Michael Tonry, Preface, in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST: HAS IT A FUTURE?, supra note
69, at vii.
263
Constitutional rights or human rights may also be construed as a counter-majoritarian
check on abusive power by democratic majorities. JOUET, supra note 4, at 220–21.
264
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010).
265
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2012).
266
Id. at 472.
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See id. at 472–73.
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Supreme Court reasoned that summarily inflicting life without parole on
juveniles harmed them without a valid policy rationale.268
While the penological objectives of deterrence, retribution, and
incapacitation are more justifiable in adult cases than juvenile ones, they also
cannot legitimately justify extreme punishments for adults, such as the fiftyyear-to-life sentence that Leandro Andrade received for shoplifting
videotapes worth $153.269 Experts widely agree that “three strikes” laws and
other draconian sentencing schemes primarily targeting adults are not
reasonably tailored to deter crime.270 Empirical evidence indicates that far
shorter sentences can achieve both general and specific deterrence.271
Similarly, lengthy prison terms inflicted on adults routinely lack a reasonable
relationship to moral culpability.
Mirroring the views of experts, generations of Justices have found the
principle of legitimacy relevant to the constitutionality of adults’ sentences.
When the Supreme Court previously deemed for three decades that “the
length of the sentence actually imposed [for a felony] is purely a matter of
legislative prerogative,”272 dissenting Justices objected that a sentence that
“makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment . . . is
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering.”273 For instance, Justice Souter’s dissent in Lockyer emphasized
that a state cannot genuinely defend in the name of public safety a policy
resulting in decades of incarceration for a nonviolent adult shoplifter.274
Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent in Harmelin likewise concluded that no
legitimate public policy justified a mandatory life without parole sentence for
an adult with no prior felony record who had been convicted of cocaine
possession, as a “sentence must rest on a rational determination that the
punished ‘criminal conduct is so atrocious that society’s interest in deterrence
and retribution wholly outweighs any considerations of reform or
rehabilitation of the perpetrator.’”275
268

The Justices especially made clear that state sentencing authorities had improperly
disregarded the mitigating circumstances of the juvenile defendants before deciding to
permanently cast them away from society. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725–26,
736–37 (2016); Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–80; Graham, 560 U.S. at 53, 79.
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Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 63 (2003).
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See generally ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 102.
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See generally id.; Daniel P. Mears et al., Recidivism and Time Served in Prison, 106 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 83 (2016).
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Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980); see also supra Section I.
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Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1013 (White, J., dissenting).
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Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 81–82 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1028 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 307 (1972) (per curiam) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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The presumption of unconstitutionality against harsh practices lacking
legitimate policy goals is not limited to criminal punishment. This principle
has equally shaped Supreme Court and state court decisions on gay rights.276
In particular, moral objections to homosexuality, a driving factor behind laws
banning same-sex marriages and civil unions,277 cannot legitimize
discrimination.278 As the Justices concluded in Obergefell v. Hodges, the
marriages of consenting same-sex adults “pose no risk of harm to themselves
or third parties.”279 Banning same-sex marriages therefore serves no
legitimate policy goal, but rather “demeans or stigmatizes” gay people.280
By the same token, moral support for retribution cannot legitimize
extreme punishments for either children or adults. Justice Kennedy had
acknowledged this concern in his 2003 speech at the American Bar
Association, which suggested awareness that a social desire “to degrade and
demean the prisoner” contributed to the gulf between American and
European justice.281 His majority opinion in Graham ultimately echoed the
perspective of former dissenting Justices, European jurists, and Beccaria
when he recognized that a punishment must have a “legitimate penological
justification.”282 Announcing a principle relevant to both juvenile and adult
cases, Kennedy added that “[c]riminal punishment can have different goals,
and choosing among them is within a legislature’s discretion . . . . It does not
follow, however, that the purposes and effects of penal sanctions are
irrelevant to the determination of Eighth Amendment restrictions.”283
D. HOPE FOR REHABILITATION AND RELEASE

In Dante’s Inferno, the entrance to hell is marked by an ominous
warning: “Abandon every hope, all you who enter.”284 The narrator shudders,
observing that “these words I see are cruel.”285 The hopelessness of modern
American prisoners condemned to die behind bars concretely illustrates
Dante’s age-old allegory. Certain inmates facing life without parole indicate
276

Simon, supra note 16, at 302–04.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“Many who deem same-sex
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Id. at 2607.
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that they would prefer to be executed.286 While some lifers are resilient, acute
psychological distress is an ordinary aspect of their bleak existence.287
Modern European nations have been far more inclined than the United
States to recognize the severe hardship of lifelong incarceration. In 1977, for
example, the German Constitutional Court held that the government violates
a prisoner’s fundamental rights if it “strips him of all hope of ever earning
his freedom.”288 The French Constitutional Court similarly declared, in
1994, that incarceration must aim “not only to protect society and ensure the
punishment of the condemned, but also to facilitate his rehabilitation and
prepare his eventual reentry into society.”289 For decades, most European
democracies avoided condemning prisoners to die without any hope of
release.290 Additionally, certain nations barred life sentences per se, such as
Spain, where the longest possible sentence is forty years in prison.291
The European Court of Human Rights’ 2013 decision in Vinter finally
held that no member state could condemn people to hopelessly die behind
bars.292 The case involved persons sentenced to life imprisonment for murder
in England and Wales.293 They could only have been eligible for release if
they had become “terminally ill or physically incapacitated,” among other
stringent criteria.294 The European Judges deemed that these “highly
restrictive conditions” barely “could really be considered release at all, if all
it meant was that a prisoner died at home or in a hospice rather than behind
prison walls.”295 After reviewing the state of international law and the
practices of multiple nations, the Judges concluded that imprisonment
without a genuine possibility of release is a fundamental human rights

286
Jessica S. Henry, Death-in-Prison Sentences, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE, supra note 16,
at 66, 74–75.
287
Marie Gottschalk, No Way Out?, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE, supra note 16, at 227, 234;
Paul H. Robinson, Life without Parole under Modern Theories of Punishment, in LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE, supra note 16, at 138, 157.
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violation.296 While the European Court effectively rejected the logic of
permanent incapacitation that is commonplace in the United States, it
strikingly cited Graham as persuasive authority.297 The citation was succinct,
coming as part of a comprehensive survey of international and foreign law,
but was significant in light of the tremendous divergence between the
European Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court’s penal
philosophies in prior decades.
Graham had explicitly held that thrusting the juvenile prisoner into a
hopeless predicament was “cruel and unusual”: “The State has denied him
any chance to [] demonstrate that he is fit to rejoin society based solely on a
nonhomicide crime that he committed while he was a child in the eyes of the
law. This the Eighth Amendment does not permit.”298 Such treatment
“deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of
restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility
of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.”299 The sentence
simply offered “no hope” to Terrance Graham, “no matter what he might do
to demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not
representative of his true character, even if he spends the next half century
attempting to atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes.”300
Hopelessness again was at issue during the oral arguments for Jackson
v. Hobbs, a companion case to Miller that concerned life without parole for
an Arkansas teenager convicted of felony murder. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg told the Arkansas Assistant Attorney General, “[Y]ou’re dealing
with a 14-year-old being sentenced to life in prison, so he will die in prison
without any hope.”301 Justice Sonia Sotomayor pressed on this point by
asking “What hope does he have?”302 The Assistant Attorney General
claimed that the juvenile was not deprived of hope because he could apply
for executive clemency.303 The Justices were unconvinced given the rarity of
clemency in Arkansas, which Bryan Stevenson, the juvenile’s attorney,
emphasized in his rebuttal.304
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Id. ¶ 59–81.
Id. ¶ 73 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010)).
298
Graham, 560 U.S. at 79.
299
Id. at 69–70.
300
Id. at 79.
301
Oral Argument (36:22), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. (2012), OYEZ (March 20, 2012),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-9646.
302
Id. at 37:30.
303
Id. at 37:57.
304
Id. at 43:47.
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The Court’s ensuing decision in Miller did not bar life without parole
categorically for juvenile homicides, although it found that it cannot be a
mandatory sentence partly because that approach would “disregard[] the
possibility of rehabilitation.”305 The Court later held in Montgomery that the
aging petitioner had a constitutional right to seek resentencing because, after
being mandatorily sentenced to life without parole as a juvenile, he had
“spent each day of the past 46 years knowing he was condemned to die in
prison.”306 In the Court’s view, such juvenile convicts “must be given the
opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if
it did not, their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be
restored.”307
On this point too, Justice Kennedy seemed to embrace the views of
Justices who had dissented against his prior interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment. Kennedy’s controlling opinion in Harmelin had given short
shrift to the principle of rehabilitation, stressing that “the Eighth Amendment
does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.”308 When
reviewing the Graham sentence, however, he wrote that “[t]he penalty
forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”309 This mirrored Justice
Stevens’s dissent in Harmelin, which underlined that sentencing an adult to
mandatory life imprisonment without parole for cocaine possession “does not
even purport to serve a rehabilitative function” and that it is “irrational” to
assert that such adult offenders are “wholly incorrigible.”310
The Lockyer dissenters reached the same conclusion, arguing that the
nonviolent shoplifter’s sentence left him no hope of paying his debt to
society: “[A]n 87-year-old man released after 50 years behind bars will have
no real life left, if he survives to be released at all.”311 As the defendant had
received consecutive twenty-five-year-to-life sentences, the dissenters
concluded it was “irrational” to claim that, following his first lengthy
sentence, the defendant still “would be so dangerous” that he would need to
spend a second stretch of twenty-five years in prison before being eligible for
parole.312

305

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 478 (2012).
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
307
Id. at 736–37.
308
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
309
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
310
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1028 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
311
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 79 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
312
Id. at 82.
306
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Accordingly, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery advanced a principle
with potentially profound ramifications: prison sentences inflicted on
juveniles cannot negate the value of rehabilitation and possibility of release.
As with dignity, proportionality, and legitimacy, the principle of
rehabilitation is far from being solely relevant in juvenile cases. Yesteryear
the Supreme Court deemed that adolescents could be executed;313 it has now
acknowledged that they are hardly irredeemable.314 It may eventually
recognize that adult prisoners are not, either.
E. AMERICAN PATH DEPENDENCE OR WESTERN CONVERGENCE?

The Supreme Court went from holding for three decades that the Eighth
Amendment has virtually nothing to say about draconian prison terms to
recognizing key sentencing principles: dignity, proportionality, legitimacy,
and rehabilitation. Even though these principles are not age-dependent and
resemble those that have made mass incarceration improbable in
contemporary Western democracies, jurists have largely reduced Graham
and its progeny to stepping stones toward reforming juvenile justice, thereby
excluding adult prisoners.315 Before our final section presenting a broader
theory on the evolution of American justice, it is worth considering why these
landmark precedents may, at first glance, appear to only concern juveniles.
First, practical reasons help explain why Graham, Miller, and
Montgomery have been cabined into a narrow “juveniles are different”
doctrine. Eighth Amendment challenges to ruthless sentences inflicted on
adult prisoners proved unsuccessful in Harmelin, Ewing, and Lockyer,
despite garnering four dissenting votes in each case.316 Seeing a new opening
following Roper’s abolition of the juvenile death penalty in 2005, opponents
of mass incarceration switched gears by focusing on life without parole for
juveniles.317 Litigators commonly seek narrowly-tailored remedies in an
effort to persuade judges. Additionally, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
313

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
314
See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 724 (2016) (quoting Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012)) (“Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole
is excessive for all but ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption’ . . . .”); Graham, 560 U.S. at 73 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573
(2005)) (“‘It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’”).
315
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
316
See supra notes 82–112 and accompanying text.
317
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61 (noting that advocates had raised an issue of first
impression).
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sometimes moves incrementally in a particular direction, as gay rights
illustrate.318 Litigators were therefore undoubtedly aware that they had a
better chance to win test cases incrementally challenging life without parole
for juveniles, rather than test cases challenging them for everyone again.319
But their strategy effectively pitted children against adults, such as by
drawing on behavioral and neurological science mitigating teenagers’
culpability.320 This pragmatic litigation tactic reinforced the notion that
“juveniles are different,” a theme that state legislators later embraced to
justify reforms abolishing life without parole for minors.321
Second, cabining the aforesaid developments into a narrow “juveniles
are different” doctrine may ironically reflect the normalization of harsh
justice in America. The doctrine could notably mean that children are not
irredeemable, pitting them against incorrigible adults deserving merciless
sentences—a zero-sum relationship. This need not be the case. One can
imagine an interpretation of “juveniles are different” that would treat age as
a mitigating circumstance under the Eighth Amendment, which would be
compatible with applying the aforesaid sentencing principles—dignity,
proportionality, legitimacy, rehabilitation—to adult prisoners. Conversely, a
rigid “juveniles are different” doctrine would create a strict age carve-out
excluding adult prisoners from Eighth Amendment protection. It is too early
to tell which interpretation will prevail, although the latter would mean that
it is not “cruel and unusual” to summarily lock up adults and “throw away
the key.” Naturally, that was not the intention of reformers like Bryan
Stevenson, who litigated Miller and is an earnest opponent of mass

318
In Lawrence, the Court held that sexual relations between men could not be
criminalized. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Lawrence was a stepping stone toward
Windsor, which struck the Defense of Marriage Act, a 1996 federal statute excluding samesex relationships from the definition of marriage. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744
(2013). Both cases provided foundation for the Court’s recognition of same-sex marriage as a
constitutional right in Obergefell. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
319
Counsel in Graham initially sought to abolish life without parole for juveniles in nonmurder cases. Br. for Pet’r, Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (No. 08-7412) (2010). After the successful
challenge in Graham, litigators sought to abolish it for all juveniles. Br. for Pet’r, Jackson v.
Hobbs [companion case to Miller], 567 U.S. 460 (No. 10-9647); Br. for Pet’r, Miller, 567 U.S.
460 (No. 10-9646). The Justices declined to do so, holding that it could solely be a nonmandatory sentence, as discussed above. But they left the door open for another future
categorical challenge, which cannot be excluded given the nationwide movement against life
without parole for teenagers. See generally CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH,
RIGHTING WRONGS, supra note 13. Due to counsel’s efforts, Montgomery also subsequently
expanded Graham and Miller’s reasoning. See generally supra Section II.A–D.
320
See appellate briefs, supra note 319.
321
See generally CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS,
supra note 13, at 4; see also infra notes 392–396 and accompanying text.
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incarceration.322 But reform efforts can sometimes backfire, as demonstrated
by how certain death penalty opponents helped normalize life without parole
by touting it as an alternative to executions.323 In other words, in a nation
where scores of citizens have become inured to world-record incarceration
levels,324 a “progressive” development like the Graham, Miller, and
Montgomery decisions could be interpreted in a way that cements ruthless
justice for adults, the truly “bad guys.”325 So far the efforts of children’s
rights advocates have not backfired, as they have led the Justices toward nonage-dependent Eighth Amendment principles. If these developments
ultimately prove fruitless for adult prisoners, it may be because of the notion
that they could not conceivably stand for more than “juveniles are different.”
Third, historiography helps explain why the academy has devoted
limited attention to the relative convergence in penal philosophy between
America and other Western democracies, namely European nations, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand. Given the extraordinary magnitude of mass
incarceration, scholarship in recent decades has understandably focused on
explaining the harshness of American justice and its international divergence,
especially from European norms.326 Moreover, considering the Court’s
historic reticence to enforce the Eighth Amendment,327 as well as the fact that
criminal justice is largely run at the state and local levels, scholars have
justifiably grown skeptical about the Court’s capacity to meaningfully
address mass incarceration.328

322
See BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 14, 16,
18 (2015).
323
See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 114, at 211.
324
A review of public opinion data on imprisonment suggests ambivalence. While
numerous Americans are amenable to criminal justice reform, barely half of the public thinks
there are too many people in prison. OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC OPINION
AND DISCOURSE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES 3, 7, 19, 31 (2014).
325
Regarding the tendency in American society to paint offenders as simply evil people,
see JOUET, supra note 4, at 194–95, 199, 203, 214–17; Kleinfeld, supra note 1, at 1029.
326
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
327
See supra Section I.
328
I agree with Marie Gottschalk’s observation that, given the harshness of modern
American justice, it may be “a mistake to view the Graham and Miller decisions as major
departures from these general trends or to interpret them as signals that the judiciary is the
Promised Land in which to roll back life sentences [for adults].” Gottschalk, supra note 14, at
357. Yet we will see in Section III that an interrelationship exists between state reforms and
Supreme Court decisions in the area of juvenile justice. This suggests that a similar pattern
might develop if the Justices reconsider their Eighth Amendment jurisprudence regarding
adult prisoners.
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All three factors suggest that various forms of path dependence329
obscured the developments identified above. The first path dependence is
predominantly shaped by litigators, the second by punitive mindsets, and the
third by the scholarly tendency to focus on the peculiar harshness of modern
American justice. Insofar as path dependence drives history, one should not
overestimate the significance of the Graham line of cases. It is definitely
possible, if not plausible, that the Court will decline to extend Eighth
Amendment principles of dignity, proportionality, legitimacy, and
rehabilitation to adult prisoners. However, one should not underestimate
these developments either. Graham, Miller, and Montgomery might mark a
transition toward broadening the constitutional safeguard against “cruel and
unusual punishments,” which may have a ripple effect on state practices.
Twenty-two states have notably abolished life without parole altogether for
juveniles, partly by pointing to the Eighth Amendment’s expanding scope.330
III. IMPERMANENCE: A COMPARATIVE THEORY ON THE EVOLUTION OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE
The paradigm shift in American penal philosophy described thus far
may reflect a broader phenomenon with potential implications for the future
of mass incarceration. In this section, I propose a theory regarding the
comparative evolution of criminal punishment to help understand these
developments and how penal attitudes are impermanent social constructs.
Just as certain elements suggest that mass incarceration has become
profoundly ingrained in the United States, other elements suggest that it may
not forever remain the face of American justice.
This theory of impermanence revolves around two simultaneous
patterns: cyclicality and steadiness of direction. The patterns resemble a
seismograph that regularly swings up or down despite moving steadily in a
given direction. On one hand, attitudes toward criminal punishment in
America and beyond are cyclical, as they historically ebb and flow between
repressive and humanitarian aspirations. This may lead to periods of
329

While path dependence is a recurrent concept in social theory, James Mahoney has
offered an instructive definition: “historical sequences in which contingent events set into
motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties.” J. Mahoney,
Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, 29 THEORY AND SOCIETY 507, 507 (2000). “The
identification of path dependence therefore involves both tracing a given outcome back to a
particular set of historical events, and showing how these events are themselves contingent
occurrences that cannot be explained on the basis of prior historical conditions.” Id. at 507–
08.
330
CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, States that Ban Life without Parole
for Children, supra note 14; see also CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH,
RIGHTING WRONGS, supra note 13.
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divergence or convergence between countries. Nowadays, after a period of
considerable divergence due to an ultra-punitive phase in the United States,
American penal philosophy may be inching toward principles that have
checked draconian prison sentences in other Western democracies: dignity,
proportionality, legitimacy, and rehabilitation. On the other hand, we may
be witnessing a long-term trend toward limiting or abolishing the harshest
criminal punishments in the West. A wider historical lens suggests that,
paradoxically, the relative steadiness of this long-term trend may coexist with
the unsteadiness of cyclical attitudes toward punishment.
The magnitude of mass incarceration, combined with its peculiar
historical and social roots,331 may lead observers to conclude that harsh
justice is innately coded in the “American DNA.” Evidence indicates
otherwise. While America’s state prisoner population exploded by over
700% from the 1970s to the 2010s,332 its incarceration rate previously was
comparable to those of other Western democracies.333 David Garland’s
scholarship has instructively warned against essentialism when interpreting
the U.S. penal system’s peculiarities.334 His conclusions about America’s
retention of capital punishment in an age of growing global abolitionism
appear applicable to mass incarceration: “Far from being the expression of
an unchanging culture, the current American system is the outcome of
historical events that unfolded within a distinctive set of institutional

331

For diverse theories about the origins of mass incarceration, see supra notes 4, 23 and
accompanying text.
332
CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT
INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 2 (2012).
333
See generally STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 2–3, 34.
334
Garland has further argued against using the “American exceptionalism” framework
to describe modern American justice on the ground that it should be reserved for “long-term,
widespread, and persistent phenomen[a].” GARLAND, supra note 138, at 23. In his view, this
framework is inadequate to explain America’s retention of the death penalty at a time when
all other Western democracies have abolished it, because this distinction “is less than forty
years old” and eclipses key nuances, such as significant regional differences in the imposition
of capital punishment within the United States. Id. From this angle, Garland may likewise
object to using “American exceptionalism” to refer to mass incarceration since it is a relatively
recent phenomenon as well. I would nonetheless suggest that the exceptionalism framework
is instructive to examine modern American justice, provided that the types of nuances that
Garland insightfully identifies are taken into account. Indeed, despite opposing the notion that
America is an “exception” with regard to capital punishment, Garland expresses similar ideas
by describing how America is “a specific variant within a general set” and “an outlier.” Id. at
23–24. “America’s death penalty may not be ‘exceptional’ but it is certainly distinctive,” he
concludes, underlining that it stems from “the peculiar ways in which the American state and
society are put together.” Id. at 309.
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structures and social processes.”335 Like other dimensions of American
exceptionalism,336 mass incarceration “is not set in stone”337 as it stems from
particular social circumstances and human agency,338 ranging from the
political climate to the nomination of new Justices following tightly
contested presidential elections.339
Insofar as penal systems are impermanent social constructs, the
evolution of capital punishment may shed light on the evolution of draconian
prison terms. The path toward the abolition of the death penalty in Western
democracies has historically been incremental, encompassing what Garland
described as “a reduced range of capital offenses and eligible offenders,” a
“decline in the frequency of executions,” and “the appearance of sharp
divisions in public attitudes towards the penalty’s propriety.”340 This trend
has occurred in the United States notwithstanding the fact that it is the lone
Western democracy to retain capital punishment. First, the Supreme Court
has abolished the death penalty for certain categories of crimes and offenders.
Murder and treason are essentially the sole remaining capital crimes,341 as the
Court concluded that death is an excessive punishment for rape342 and most
accomplices in felony murder cases.343 It is no longer constitutional to
335

GARLAND, supra note 138, at 309. For a critique of essentialism, see also Garland,
supra note 19, at 355, 365–66.
336
Regarding the definition of American exceptionalism, see supra notes 46, 47 and
accompanying text.
337
JOUET, supra note 4, at 273.
338
In addition to Garland, diverse scholars have cautioned against essentialism and
fatalism in analyzing the evolution of American justice. See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 258, at
774 n.67.
339
For a discussion of how such factors have shaped the evolution of the U.S. death
penalty system, see Steiker, supra note 258, at 77.
340
Garland, supra note 19, at 355.
341
See GARLAND, supra note 138, at 303; Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of
Terrorism: An Explanation and Evaluation of Treason’s Return in Democratic States, 42
VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 1443, 1500–01 (2009).
342
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008) (finding death penalty
unconstitutional for the rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (finding death penalty unconstitutional for the rape of an adult).
343
See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (finding death penalty
unconstitutional for accomplice felony murder absent “proof that [defendant] killed or
attempted to kill” or that he “intended or contemplated that life would be taken”). But see
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit
death penalty for accomplice who participates in a felony resulting in murder and whose
mental state is reckless indifference). While the Supreme Court “has not conditioned the
execution of an actual killer on any culpable mental state,” the “execution of felony murderers
who kill inadvertently has become ‘unusual,’” as only five inadvertent killers have been
executed since 1973. Guyora Binder, Brenner Fissell & Robert Weisberg, Unusual: The Death
Penalty for Inadvertent Killing, 93 IND. L.J. 549, 588–89 (2018).
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execute juveniles344 and the “mentally retarded.”345 Second, the number of
death sentences and executions has declined since the start of the twenty-first
century;346 meanwhile, the number of abolitionist states has risen.347 Third,
the death penalty has been a recurrent matter of controversy in American
society.348 As Garland emphasizes, “[t]his trajectory of decline, with minor
variations, occurred in the United States just as it did throughout the
[W]estern world.”349 Under this framework, America could be seen as a
laggard rather than a permanent exception when it comes to the death penalty.
One may draw the hypothesis that this pattern mirrors the evolution of
American law toward draconian prison terms. First, the Supreme Court and
state authorities have abolished life without parole for certain categories of
crimes and offenders. Following Graham, life without parole is no longer a
constitutional punishment for a juvenile in a nonhomicide case.350 Under
Miller, it is also unconstitutional to impose it mandatorily on a juvenile in a
homicide case.351 And twenty-two states have concluded that life without
parole should no longer apply in juvenile cases per se, thereby granting them
more protections than under the Eighth Amendment.352 Second, various
states have reduced their prison populations.353 A California ballot initiative
illustratively scaled back the state’s merciless “three strikes” law.354 The
Supreme Court additionally ordered California, in Brown v. Plata, to reduce
prison overcrowding because “[a] prison that deprives prisoners of basic
sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the

344
345
346

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002).
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY
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2018: YEAR END REPORT 1–5

(2018).
347

DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., States With and Without the Death Penalty, https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/N5EF-KAXK] (last
visited Jan. 19, 2019).
348
See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2009);
GARLAND, supra note 138.
349
Garland, supra note 19, at 355.
350
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
351
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 460 (2012).
352
CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, States that Ban Life without Parole
for Children, supra note 14; see also CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH,
RIGHTING WRONGS, supra note 13.
353
SENTENCING PROJECT, FEWER PRISONERS, LESS CRIME: A TALE OF THREE STATES 1, 2,
8 (2014).
354
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL THREE STRIKES PROJECT, PROPOSITION 36 PROGRESS REPORT
(2014), https://www.threestrikes.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Three-Strike-Project-Prop36-Progress-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/95DJ-K56J].
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concept of human dignity.”355 That decision may have played a role in
reducing California’s incarceration rate.356 Third, a social debate about the
propriety of mass incarceration has emerged.357 The Supreme Court’s
repeated refusal to find ruthless sentences “cruel and unusual” under the
Eighth Amendment between 1983 and 2010 led to pushback from dissenting
Justices, lower courts, and prominent experts.358 A relatively broad range of
political leaders, media outlets, traditional civil society organizations, and
activist groups have called for reform.359 A new wave of prosecutors have
been elected after opposing mass incarceration.360 In late 2018, Congress
passed a bipartisan federal sentencing reform—the FIRST STEP Act—by an
overwhelming margin and with President Donald Trump’s support.361 While
the legislation’s impact may be limited, it is the product of longstanding
efforts to push Congress to address over-punitiveness. Some reformers
envision it as a building block toward wider changes.362
355

Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011).
Rob Kuznia, An Unprecedented Experiment in Mass Forgiveness, WASH. POST (Feb.
8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/an-unprecedented-experiment-in-massforgiveness/2016/02/08/45899f9c-a059-11e5-a3c5-c77f2cc5a43c_story.html?utm_term=.ed
464b70d3de [https://perma.cc/4T4V-XRC4].
357
See JOUET, supra note 4, at 3, 204–07.
358
See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam) (scolding the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals and a District Court for not following the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment); People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Mich.
1992) (emphasizing that the bar on “cruel or unusual punishment” in the Michigan
Constitution has a broader scope than the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as
interpreted by the Supreme Court); Nilsen, supra note 31, at 165 n.262 (discussing the
Michigan Supreme Court’s pushback against the U.S. Supreme Court in Bullock); see also
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV.
69, 71 (2012) (describing how 163 experts, including former federal judges, prosecutors, and
U.S. Attorneys General, filed an amicus brief in support of a petty offender challenging the
constitutionality of his fifty-five-year sentence, to no avail).
359
See, e.g., Anand Giridharadas, Momentum on Criminal Justice Repair, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/us/momentum-on-criminal-justicerepair.html [https://perma.cc/VZ7H-M9MF].
360
See Sklansky, supra note 258.
361
The acronym stands for “Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely
Transitioning Every Person Act.” The House and Senate passed the bill by lopsided margins
of 358-36 and 87-12, respectively. See S.756 - First Step Act of 2018, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/756/all-actions?q=%7B%22search%22%
3A%5B%22%5C%22first+step+act%5C%22%22%5D%7D&r=5&overview=closed#tabs
[https://perma.cc/4TQF-4X6V] (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).
362
See generally Ames Grawert & Tim Lau, How the FIRST STEP Act Became Law—
and What Happens Next, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.brennan
center.org/blog/how-first-step-act-became-law-and-what-happens-next [https://perma.cc/R6
RA-X6NS]; Justin George, Okay, What’s the Second Step?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 19,
2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/12/19/okay-what-s-the-second-step [https://
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These three shifts regarding mass incarceration in American society
resemble the ones that Garland underlined for the death penalty: narrowed
eligibility for harsh punishment, reduced frequency of punishment, and
heightened social divide about the punishment’s propriety.363 Assessing how
this shift compares to other Western democracies is more challenging than
for the death penalty because they have never experienced American-style
mass incarceration. Yet the evolution of European penology has been
marked by a narrowing scope of repressiveness, limited use of lengthy
periods of incarceration, and greater skepticism toward the propriety of
incarceration.364
That being noted, America’s shift on mass incarceration should not be
overestimated. The existence of a bipartisan consensus for genuine criminal
justice reform was already doubtful years before Donald Trump’s Attorney
General Jeff Sessions raised eyebrows by directing federal prosecutors to
systematically seek the harshest sentences possible.365 Even though
President Trump later backed federal sentencing reform with the FIRST
STEP Act, the legislation mainly aims to reduce punishments for select
nonviolent offenders.366 Put otherwise, this legislation covers a segment of
perma.cc/7789-9RHS]; Charlotte Resing, How the FIRST STEP Act Moves Criminal Justice
Reform Forward, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smartjustice/mass-incarceration/how-first-step-act-moves-criminal-justice-reform-forward [https://
perma.cc/7HDU-KS4B].
363
Garland, supra note 19, at 355.
364
See supra Section II. Australia and New Zealand may be relative counter-examples to
this trend in the West given that their increasingly harsh penal systems have made more
offenders eligible for life sentences, including without parole. Still, their penal systems are
drastically more moderate and humane than the United States’. See generally Fitz-Gibbon,
supra note 181, at 75 (discussing life sentences in Australia); Oleson, supra note 195, at 278
(noting that “the scope and scale of the New Zealand three-strikes system are modest”
compared to U.S. three-strikes laws); Yvette Tinsley & Warren Young, Overuse in the
Criminal Justice System in New Zealand, INT’L PENAL AND PENITENTIARY FOUNDATION SERIES
(forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3031128 [https://perma.cc/8RCP-RHUZ]
(describing punitive trends in New Zealand); WORLD PRISON BRIEF, supra note 39 (indicating
that Australia and New Zealand respectively have incarceration rates of 172 and 214 prisoners
per resident, compared to 655 prisoners per resident in America).
365
As I described in Exceptional America, talk about a bipartisan consensus for criminal
justice reform has existed for at least a decade despite limited change. See JOUET, supra note
4, at 3–4, 204–07; see also Chris Suellentrop, The Right Has a Jailhouse Conversion, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, at E46 (discussing an emerging bipartisan consensus for criminal justice
reform); Sari Horwitz & Matt Zapotosky, Sessions Issues Sweeping New Criminal Charging
Policy, WASH. POST (May 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/sessions-issues-sweeping-new-criminal-charging-policy/2017/05/11/4752bd42-369
7-11e7-b373-418f6849a004_story.html [https://perma.cc/3HWR-SHHE].
366
See generally Keith Humphreys, We Have Nothing to Fear from Federal Sentencing
Reform, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/27
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federal prisoners, who themselves are a segment of all prisoners nationwide
since approximately 91% are in state prisons and local jails.367 In general,
many Democratic and Republican politicians advocating for reform focus
almost exclusively on nonviolent offenders, ignoring the fact that most state
prisoners were convicted for violent crimes.368 The misconception that
ending the “War on Drugs” will end mass incarceration has also hindered
broader reform efforts.369 America’s incarceration rate remains immense.370
The persistence of violent policing practices,371 the emergence of a wide
surveillance apparatus in the digital age,372 and other infringements on civil
liberties further call into question whether American justice has grown more
humane, egalitarian, and democratic.
Moreover, it is relevant to our theory that scarcely predictable swings
and backlashes have marked the evolution of American justice in recent
decades. When the Supreme Court struck all death penalty statutes
nationwide under the Eighth Amendment in 1972, it may have seemed that
America was joining other Western democracies in abolishing capital
punishment.373 States reacted by passing new death penalty statutes that the
Court approved in 1976.374 Practically no other modern Western democracy
has so far reintroduced capital punishment following its abolition. New
Zealand is a noteworthy exception, as it abolished the practice in 1941,
briefly reintroduced it in 1950, and permanently abolished it in 1962.375 For
several decades, America now stands as the lone Western democracy to
/we-have-nothing-fear-federal-sentencing-reform/?utm_term=.aa3cc6c7fd4a [https://perma.c
c/7LK9-JFHX].
367
WORLD PRISON BRIEF, supra note 201.
368
See Forman, supra note 36, at 24–25.
369
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
370
See generally WORLD PRISON BRIEF, supra note 39.
371
“The killings of citizens by police in 2016 is a phenomenon in the United States as it
is in no other peaceful and fully developed nation on earth.” FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN
POLICE KILL 247 (2017). The peculiar proliferation of firearms in America and the relatedly
high rate of assaults on police significantly contribute to this phenomenon. Id.
372
As Bernard Harcourt describes, digital media has enabled the rise of a massive
surveillance apparatus, although “[n]one of this should come entirely as a surprise. There is a
long history of cooperation between tech companies—especially in communications and
information delivery—and intelligence in this country and abroad,” as illustrated by spying
on the American public’s telegrams back in the 1920s. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED:
DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 67 (2015).
373
Steiker, supra note 258, at 86–88.
374
Id.; see also Gregg v Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231 (1976) (decision reintroducing the
death penalty); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 238 (1972) (per curiam) (decision abolishing
the death penalty).
375
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
AGENDA 9 (1986).
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retain capital punishment.376
Aside from considerable geographic
377
variations, patterns in the usage of the death penalty in American society
have been unsteady. After a drop in the 1970s, death sentences and
executions surged in the United States, prompting Stuart Banner to observe
that “[b]y the end of the twentieth century capital punishment [was] back
with a vengeance.”378 Death sentences and executions then dropped again.379
Mass incarceration likewise was a hardly foreseeable phenomenon.
Until the 1960s, the legal norm and policy goal of rehabilitation was
ingrained in the U.S. penal system.380 This model was mostly repudiated in
subsequent decades as the “tough on crime” movement rose, and the prison
population exploded. But we saw above that ending mass incarceration has
become a matter of recurrent debate in early twenty-first century America.
Attitudes toward imprisonment in other Western democracies, such as
France,381 the United Kingdom,382 Canada,383 and New Zealand,384 have also
fluctuated between rehabilitative and punitive goals. Certain European
leaders advocating harsher justice have even called for emulating America’s
“tough on crime” policies, illustrating another form of transatlantic
convergence.385 Yet cyclical variations have occurred on a greater scale in
the United States than in contemporary Western democracies, which have
not experienced mass incarceration. The U.S. penal system is comparatively
less stable, partly reflecting broader polarization in modern America about

376

JOUET, supra note 4, at 218–24; ZIMRING, supra note 176, at 27, 39, 46–47.
Profound disparities exist both at the state and county levels. Since 1976 approximately
52% of all executions in the United States stem from barely 2% of its counties. See DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., THE 2% DEATH PENALTY: HOW A MINORITY OF COUNTIES
PRODUCE MOST DEATH CASES AT ENORMOUS COSTS TO ALL (2013), https://files.deathpenalty
info.org/documents/pdf/TwoPercentReport.f1564408816.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC43-KDN
M].
378
BANNER, supra note 348, at 267.
379
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 346, at 1–6.
380
See generally GARLAND, supra note 4, at 20, 58, 62, 143; Tonry, supra note 69 at 7–8.
381
See generally Hodgson & Soubise, supra note 216, at 221, 221–23, 239–40.
382
See generally GARLAND, supra note 4, at 60.
383
See generally Doob & Webster, Weathering the Storm?, supra note 190, at 410–11,
414–15.
384
See generally John Pratt & Marie Clark, Penal Populism in New Zealand, 7
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 303 (2005); Tinsley & Young, supra note 364, at 17–31. Regarding the
abolition, reintroduction, and re-abolition of the death penalty in New Zealand, see also
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 375, at 9.
385
See WACQUANT, supra note 101, at 7–55 (discussing attempts to “export” harsh
American justice to Europe).
377
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whether to extend or radically roll back basic constitutional rights.386 By
demonstrating that U.S. penal attitudes are not locked in stone, however, this
state of impermanence suggests that American justice is amenable to the
social transformations that have limited punitiveness elsewhere in the West.
The evolution of juvenile justice in the United States epitomizes how
paradigm shifts between rehabilitative and repressive concerns have shaped
American law. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the
creation of juvenile court systems aiming to protect children from traditional
criminal law’s punitiveness.387 Although early juvenile courts could treat
children harshly despite their benevolent rhetoric, they carried a therapeutic
mandate.388 This objective was largely abandoned after the emergence of
mass incarceration in the 1970s, when teenagers routinely faced merciless
punishments. In particular, the influential “super-predator” theory reversed
the original juvenile justice system’s conception of teenagers as vulnerable
persons in need of treatment, instead painting them as practically worse than
adults due to their violent callousness.389 The main proponent of the “superpredator” scare, the criminologist John DiIulio, ultimately disavowed his
own research390 and joined an amicus brief that criminologists filed in Miller
to oppose life without parole for juveniles.391
Building on Graham, the Court’s decision in Miller bolstered a national
reform movement leading the number of states banning life imprisonment
without parole for juveniles to quadruple between 2012 and 2018.392 As of
October 2019, twenty-two states had banned the practice.393 They include
386
These circumstances reflect particularly profound partisan divisions in American
society over a wide range of basic legal and policy issues, including the role of government,
wealth inequality, race, religion, and human rights. See JOUET, supra note 4, at 27–39.
387
CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 29 (3d ed. 1991); Sanford J.
Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: A Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1207 (1970).
388
See generally SIMONSEN, supra note 387 at 29, 35; DAVID S. TANENHAUS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: IN RE GAULT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 3, 8–11 (2011);
Fox, supra note 387, at 1207.
389
See Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has
Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at 19.
390
Id.
391
Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Miller, 567 U.S.
at 460 (No. 10-9646), 2012 WL 174240 (“Amicus Brief of Criminologists in Miller”).
392
CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, Washington State Supreme Court
Rules Life Without Parole for Children Unconstitutional (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.fair
sentencingofyouth.org/washington-state-supreme-court-rules-life-without-parole-children-un
constitutional/ [https://perma.cc/XF6H-KC4C] (noting that five states abolished life without
parole for juveniles in 2012, whereas twenty-one had done so by the end of 2018).
393
CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, States that Ban Life without Parole
for Children, supra note 14.
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predominantly liberal states like Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont,
as well as predominantly conservative states like Texas, Utah, and
Wyoming.394 Sim Gill, the District Attorney for Salt Lake County, Utah,
illustratively declared that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions inspired “a
major paradigm shift in how the state can and will pursue just outcomes in
cases involving juveniles who commit serious crimes.”395 He thus embraced
the Utah state legislature’s decision to eliminate life without the possibility
of parole for minors, finding it a “sound policy” because “given time,
juveniles can outgrow antisocial adolescent behavior.”396 California
reformers equally pointed to Miller for support as the state amended its
statute on the transfer of juveniles to criminal court by stipulating that judges
may consider mitigating circumstances regarding teenage impetuosity and
mental development.397
Several state courts have drawn upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment analysis as persuasive authority to find broader rights for
juveniles under their state constitutions.398 In the words of the Iowa Supreme
Court, “[w]e have generally accepted the principles enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in the Roper, Graham, and Miller trilogy in our
interpretation of article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution,”399 which also
forbids “cruel and unusual punishment.”400 In 2016, it held that inflicting life
without parole sentences on juveniles was unconstitutional per se under the
Iowa Constitution.401 In 2018, the Washington Supreme Court found this
sentence to be categorically “cruel punishment” under the state’s
constitution.402 It added that even if meting out life without parole to a
teenager were not inherently “cruel,” it would be constitutionally
“disproportionate” to culpability.403

394
See CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS, supra note
13, at 4.
395
Id. at 11.
396
Id.
397
S. Rules Comm., B. Analysis, S.B. 382, 2015-16 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 13, 2015).
398
For a broader discussion of state court decisions spurred by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Graham line of cases, see Sarah French Russell & Tracy L. Denholtz, Procedures for
Proportionate Sentences: The Next Wave of Eighth Amendment Noncapital Litigation, 48
CONN. L. REV. 1121 (2016).
399
Iowa v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 833–34 (Iowa 2016).
400
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 17.
401
Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 811.
402
Washington v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 352-55 (Wash. 2018); see also WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 14.
403
Bassett, 428 P.3d at 354–55.

760

JOUET

[Vol. 109

Because criminal justice in America is primarily run at the state and
local levels, scholars have correctly underlined that neither the U.S. Supreme
Court nor the federal government as a whole can singlehandedly put an end
to mass incarceration.404 At the same time, the evolution of state juvenile
justice in the aftermath of Graham, Miller, and Montgomery demonstrates
that a symbiotic relationship can exist between federal and state law—to boot
one tied to the Eighth Amendment’s evolution.
These developments should not obscure how American juvenile justice
remains exceptionally harsh by international standards.405 By some
measures, “the gulf in incarceration rates between America and other
Western democracies nowadays is even worse for children than for
adults.”406 For example, the overall incarceration rate in the United States is
respectively nine times and eleven times higher than the rate for Germany
and Sweden.407 But the U.S. juvenile incarceration rate is respectively
fourteen times and eighty-four times higher than for these nations.408 The
rest of the Western world bans life sentences and other lengthy prison terms
for juveniles.409 By comparison, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a limited
step in that direction. In Miller, the Justices declined to categorically abolish
life without parole for juveniles.410 Beside (nonmandatory) life without
parole in murder cases, adolescents can still receive ordinary life sentences
(with the possibility of parole) or extremely lengthy prison terms (say twenty

404
For instance, John Pfaff has argued that “[t]he federal government cannot end mass
incarceration. Ending it will require state-by-state, even county-by-county fights.” John Pfaff,
Bill Clinton Is Wrong about His Crime Bill. So Are the Protesters He Lectured, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/magazine/bill-clinton-is-wr
ong-about-his-crime-bill-so-are-the-protesters-he-lectured.html?partner=bloomberg [https://
perma.cc/2UUB-H6A7]; see also Gottschalk, supra note 14, at 357. By the same token, I
previously emphasized that “profound change will probably have to happen at the state and
local level.” JOUET, supra note 4, at 204.
405
“[M]any juvenile justice advocates and scholars” view America as “a problematic case
not to be followed due to its more punitive approach to juvenile cases.” Franklin E. Zimring
and Máximo Langer, One Theme or Many? The Search for a Deep Structure in Global
Juvenile Justice, in JUVENILE JUSTICE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 383, 401 (Zimring, Langer &
David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2015).
406
JOUET, supra note 4, at 201.
407
WORLD PRISON BRIEF, supra note 39.
408
NEAL HAZEL, CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF YOUTH JUSTICE, YOUTH JUSTICE
BOARD FOR ENGLAND AND WALES 59 (2008).
409
JOUET, supra note 4, at 218–19.
410
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).
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to fifty years) for other types of convictions.411 Stark racial disparities persist,
including in states where the reform movement has gained traction.412
Certain states have also resisted the Supreme Court’s directive to
reconsider draconian juvenile punishments. In 2018, the Louisiana Parole
Board refused to release the prisoner at the heart of the prominent
Montgomery ruling, in which the Justices decided to retroactively apply
Miller’s holding prohibiting life without parole as a mandatory sentence for
a child.413 Henry Montgomery, who is African-American, was seventy-one
years old by the time the parole board reviewed the mandatory life without
parole sentence he received at seventeen for murdering a police officer. The
Board voted by a 2-1 margin to keep him behind bars.414 Furthermore,
prosecutors in Louisiana, as in numerous other states, retain considerable
discretion to pursue draconian juvenile sentences. Louisiana prosecutors
have sought life without parole in one third of the 258 juvenile cases eligible
for resentencing under Montgomery, namely the same sentence as before.415
Nevertheless, since Montgomery, states have halved the number of
persons serving juvenile life without parole, both through resentencing
hearings and state legislative reforms.416 Alongside the twenty-two states
that have abolished this punishment, another six did not use it as of October
2019.417 These developments constitute a shift away from the ultra-punitive
ideology that characterized juvenile justice for several decades in the age of
the “super-predator” theory418 and a relative return toward the therapeutic
mandate that juvenile justice carried before mass incarceration emerged.419
411

JOUET, supra note 4, at 218–19.
CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, MONTGOMERY MOMENTUM: TWO
YEARS OF PROGRESS SINCE MONTGOMERY V. LOUISIANA 4 (2018).
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Killing Deputy When He Was Juvenile, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge) (Feb. 19, 2018), https://
www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/courts/article_acca953e-1579-11e8-aa66-1b036f4
5b902.html [https://perma.cc/894K-SCLK].
414
Id.
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LA. YOUTH JUSTICE COALITION, Louisiana Prosecutors Buck Supreme Court Mandates
Regarding Children (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.laccr.org/youth-justice/?jjpl_newspost=5746
[https://perma.cc/K9TP-J4E9].
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CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, supra note 412; see also JUVENILE
SENTENCING PROJECT, Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentences in the United States: November
2017 Snapshot (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.juvenilelwop.org/wp-content/uploads/Novem
ber%202017%20Snapshot%20of%20JLWOP%20Sentences%2011.20.17.pdf, [https://perma
.cc/9Q65-C9ZD].
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From this historical perspective, the evolution of American justice appears to
reflect societal instability rather than an immutable status quo.
Yet how does one reconcile this instability with the hypothesis that
America might be on a parallel trajectory as other Western democracies in
narrowing eligibility for the harshest prison terms, reducing the frequency of
their application, and facing a heightened social divide about these
punishments’ propriety?420 Instability and steadiness of direction may seem
to be mutually exclusive.
In reality, it is possible for a society’s penal system to historically move
in a particular direction, such as by gradually eliminating harsh punishments,
and for penal attitudes in that society to simultaneously fluctuate between
repressive and humanitarian concerns. Political science data reflecting the
existence of cycles in American politics provide a lens into this phenomenon.
Since the 1950s, the political climate has fluctuated between the left and
right.421 The public’s mood has additionally swung to the right when liberals
were in power, and to the left when conservatives were.422 Attitudes toward
crime can similarly be more or less conservative or liberal depending on the
period.423 This situation is not limited to the United States. Illustratively,
France abolished the death penalty in 1981, and its modern penal system
seldom metes out lengthy prison sentences.424 In past decades, changes in
the French political climate have nonetheless contributed to the periodic rise
and fall of politicians advocating a harsher penal system.425 Like a
seismograph moving steadily forward notwithstanding how its needle can
swing up or down, French law has gone in a given direction despite how the
social climate swings between repressive or humane concerns. This does not
signify that French justice is necessarily on the path to progress, as Michel
Foucault’s analysis of subtle forms of modern social control demonstrates.426
The analogy to the steady direction of a seismograph also has limitations.
Because the law is a social construct, its direction may someday reverse itself
altogether or lead to uncharted territory. Contrary to Francis Fukuyama’s
theory, it is doubtful that the advent of liberal democracy in the West will
mark the “end of history.”427 For instance, the rise of far-right European
420

Garland, supra note 19, at 355.
LARRY BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
GILDED AGE 289–90 (2d ed. 2016).
422
Id.
423
See generally JOUET, supra note 4, at 195–207.
424
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political parties aiming to institute illiberal democracies or authoritarian
regimes, dismantle the European Union, and repeal human rights standards,
including international law requiring E.U. members to abolish the death
penalty,428 readily belie rigid historicism.429 History does not follow a set of
laws. Still, the law has a history. Scholars can identify trends, patterns, and
fluctuations. None are invulnerable to change but they may exist for a
historical period, which may range from decades to centuries or the
foreseeable future.
How does this account relate to seminal theories regarding the
evolutionary trajectory of criminal punishments in liberal democracies?
Émile Durkheim predicted that punishments would milden over time due to
the elimination of corporal sanctions, the death penalty’s decline, and the
normalization of incarceration as a mode of punishment.430 As we saw
above, Durkheim considered that greater respect for the human dignity of the
prisoner played a role in this process.431 Foucault concurred that liberal
democracies gradually became less brutal in their modes of punishment yet
called into question Durkheim’s theory of increasing mildness.432
Nonviolent punishments, in Foucault’s view, are primarily “a new tactic of
power” aiming to control prisoners rather than expand their individual

428
E.U. membership requires abolition consistently with its Charter of Fundamental
Rights, which states, “No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed.” Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 2, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1; see
also PAOLO PASSAGLIA, L’ABOLITION DE LA PEINE DE MORT: UNE ÉTUDE COMPARÉE 145–47
(2012). The Council of Europe (C.O.E.), a distinct body comprising forty-seven member
states, has also made abolition a cornerstone of its mission. See ZIMRING, supra note 176, at
25–29, 36. The European Court of Human Rights, a C.O.E. institution, interprets the European
Convention on Human Rights. An optional 1983 protocol to the Convention abolishes the
death penalty except in wartime, whereas a 2002 protocol abolishes it in all circumstances.
Nearly all member states have ratified them. See Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the
Death Penalty in All Circumstances, May 3, 2002, Europ. T.S. No. 183 (ratified by all member
states except Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia); Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the
Death Penalty, Apr. 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114 (ratified by all member states except
Russia). To place Europe’s abolitionist foreign policy in a wider analytical context, see also
Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 1, 6 (2011) (arguing that “the European position is just one among many approaches
to international law that reflect a mixture of national self-interest and national (as opposed to
universal) values. The United States looks less distinctive when compared to the world as a
whole, than when it is compared only to the European democracies.”).
429
Regarding the definition of historicism, see supra note 21.
430
Durkheim, supra note 26, at 77–78, 80.
431
See id. and accompanying text.
432
FOUCAULT, supra note 174, at 31.
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liberty.433 The theory of impermanence advanced in my Article appears
compatible with both Durkheim and Foucault’s claims. If Western
democracies are converging in reducing the scope of repressiveness, it may
reflect either, or perhaps both, a Durkheimian trend toward milder
punishments and a Foucauldian trend toward insidious forms of social
control.
My theory evokes a seismograph that regularly swings up or down while
moving steadily in a particular direction. American justice may cyclically
oscillate between repressive or humanitarian aspirations and simultaneously
converge with other Western democracies in gradually limiting or abolishing
the harshest punishments over the long term. On a seismograph, a terrible
earthquake may occur. This may be one way to perceive mass
incarceration—an intense social shock but not the permanent essence of
American punishment. On the other hand, it could be that mass incarceration
was such a profound shock that it has fundamentally destabilized and altered
American justice.
Ideological proclivities, discriminatory motives,
institutional dynamics, and political incentives to routinely inflict harsh
punishments may persist. Nevertheless, even if mass incarceration lasts, the
theory may hold true for the gradual abolition of the harshest punishments in
the United States, including life without parole and the death penalty. In any
event, neither of these potential scenarios signifies that utopia awaits. Social
injustices abound in modern Europe, despite the absence of mass
incarceration, life without parole, and executions.
In sum, the paradigm shift in American penal philosophy may reflect
more than a shift at the Supreme Court, including the evolving judicial
philosophies of Anthony Kennedy and other influential Justices. It might
therefore continue over time, notwithstanding Kennedy’s retirement and
replacement by Brett Kavanaugh, a Trump appointee. In addition to the
Eighth Amendment’s broadening interpretation, we saw that non-negligible
reforms have occurred at the state level, and that the long-term trajectory of
American justice might be relatively consistent with wider developments in
Western sensibilities. The disproportional attention devoted to the
idiosyncrasies of swing Justices has not only overshadowed these patterns,
but also the fact that idiosyncrasies are far from unique to the United States.
At first glance, one may likewise be tempted to dismiss the growing
importance of dignity in German law434 as merely the product of soulsearching and atonement for the Holocaust and other atrocities of the Third
Id. (author’s translation).
See Luc Heuschling, La dignité de l’être humain dans la jurisprudence
constitutionnelle allemande, in LA DIGNITÉ SAISIE PAR LES JUGES EN EUROPE 115, supra note
160, 115–27.
433
434
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Reich. While these peculiarities have partly shaped the evolution of German
law,435 dignity has gained significance in diverse Western societies.436
Similarly, one may be inclined to claim that France’s abolition of the death
penalty in 1981 reflected nothing more than the election of President François
Mitterrand and his Socialist government that year, after the left-wing had
been out of power for several decades.437 Such a “Mitterrand effect” might
indeed be the most immediate reason why France abolished capital
punishment in 1981 and not earlier. However, a wider analytical framework
demonstrates that France’s abolition of the death penalty is consistent with a
trend in the Western world toward reducing the scope of the harshest
punishments. Each Western democracy plausibly has its own version of
America’s “Kennedy effect,” France’s “Mitterrand effect,” or Germany’s
“Holocaust atonement effect,” namely historically contingent factors
involving human agency that played a role in penal reform. These factors
should not eclipse broader trends in diverse Western societies, which may
inch forward on a rather comparable path through different social
circumstances. The United States does not appear to be a permanent
exception to this trend.438 At the very least, this historical and comparative
perspective may provide a more nuanced picture of American exceptionalism
in the age of mass incarceration.
CONCLUSION
If mass incarceration were an edifice, its pillars would include the
negation of human dignity, the disproportionality of punishment to
culpability, the pursuit of illegitimate policy objectives, and hopelessness for
the prisoner whose rehabilitation is irrelevant. The Supreme Court’s
landmark decisions in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery challenged all these
pillars of mass incarceration.439 While they did so in juvenile life without
435

Id. at 115, 119. The concept of dignity in modern German law has multiple roots
besides repentance for the Nazis’ atrocities, as it predated the Third Reich’s rise. See id. at
115–17, 120, 125–27.
436
See, e.g., id. at 120–23 (noting that the advent of dignity in German law tended to
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in the penal systems of Western democracies).
437
See generally ZIMRING, supra note 176, at 22 (analyzing how France’s abolition
reflected a European shift, although Mitterrand’s election led to the national reform).
438
See Garland, supra note 19, at 355.
439
Empirical evidence indicates that systemic racial discrimination is another driving
factor behind mass incarceration, although the Court has been disinclined to address this issue
for decades. In comparison, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved significantly since
Graham. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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parole cases, their reasoning could largely apply to adults facing draconian
prison terms.
The treatment of age nonetheless remains a key point of divergence
between European and American punishment, as the Eighth Amendment may
be evolving toward a strict age carve-out separating adolescent from adult
prisoners. This outcome would partly reflect the focus on neurological and
behavioral science that the Justices drew upon in concluding that juveniles
are more impulsive than adults and grow more mature with age.440 As Rachel
Barkow noted, “social science data about the reduced culpability of
juveniles” may have “tipped the scales” in Graham and Miller.441 “Without
similar data about the capacity for change in adults, it is unlikely that the
Supreme Court will want to take the same categorical leap” in cases
involving adults.442 Graham and its progeny could thereby lead to a rigid
“juveniles are different” doctrine that would not extend these Eighth
Amendment protections to adult prisoners. In fact, by pitting malleable
children against supposedly irredeemable adults, the “juveniles are different”
framework could serve to rationalize grossly excessive prison terms for those
over eighteen.443
Even though a detailed discussion of age carve-outs is beyond this
Article’s scope, it is relevant that the narrow “juveniles are different” doctrine
rests on an incomplete understanding of the relationship between age and
crime. Firstly, the prefrontal cortex of the brain regulating impulse control
does not complete its maturation process until approximately the midtwenties.444 Secondly, it is well established that human beings in America
and other Western societies tend to “age out” of crime, as the crime rate rises
in adolescence, peaks around twenty years old, and then gradually declines
before flattening by the fifties.445 These two scientific elements call into
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question a categorical cutoff under which the Eighth Amendment’s bar on
“cruel and unusual punishments” would apply to certain draconian prison
terms inflicted on juveniles but fully exclude people once they turn eighteen
under the pretense that adult offenders are normally irredeemable, unlike
children. In other words, the rigid “juveniles are different” doctrine is
inconsistent with the very body of science from which it stems.
The focus on the differences between juveniles and adults in the
aftermath of Graham has overshadowed a measure of convergence between
America and other Western democracies after decades of considerable
divergence. We saw in this Article that three relative shifts relevant to mass
incarceration in the United States are analogous to the shifts that David
Garland observed concerning the evolution of the death penalty in the West:
narrowed eligibility for punishment, reduced frequency of punishment, and
heightened social divide about the punishment’s propriety.446
My comparative theory regarding the evolution of criminal punishment
and Western sensibilities suggests a state of impermanence. American justice
may cyclically ebb and flow between repressive or humanitarian approaches
and simultaneously converge with the rest of the West in limiting or
abolishing the harshest punishments over the long term. Divergence
continues to greatly exceed convergence and the ethos of modern American
justice helps explain mass incarceration,447 but norms are social constructs.
A lengthy status quo can sometimes appear as an eternal state of affairs, yet
it seldom is.
The history of modern criminal justice scholarship sheds light on why
these patterns have received insufficient attention. The exceptional
punitiveness of modern American law has led scholars to concentrate on its
divergence from Europe. This has at times fostered both fatalism and
essentialism about the irredeemable ruthlessness of American justice. A
profound divergence does exist nowadays, as my own scholarship has
emphasized,448 although a few generations ago American justice was not
drastically harsher than in Europe or elsewhere in the West.
Should America keep converging with other Western democracies in
coming decades, the attenuation or end of mass incarceration will not herald
utopia. Imprisonment is not the sole form of harsh social treatment. A just
penal system is an ideal that may always remain as elusive as genuine
democracy. Societies may still inch toward these ideals.

446

Garland, supra note 19, at 355.
For a cogent description of distinct norms in modern American and European justice,
refer to Kleinfeld, supra note 1.
448
JOUET, supra note 4, at 194–231.
447

768

JOUET

[Vol. 109

Time will tell whether the ongoing developments in American penal
philosophy will have broader implications for adult prisoners or whether they
will remain mostly limited to juvenile justice. The history of American
criminal punishment, like perhaps all of history, can reflect unpredictable
swings, backlashes, regressions, and transformations. So far, the Supreme
Court has contributed to a relevant paradigm shift. Due to an oft-overlooked
symbiotic relationship between federal and state law, the Justices’ seminal
juvenile decisions bolstered state reform movements.449 Certain states that
once led the nation in passing merciless juvenile sentencing laws, such as
Texas, categorically abolished life without parole for minors.450 This historic
reversal suggests that a future paradigm shift regarding the rights of adult
prisoners cannot be dismissed.
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